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ABSTRACT

This article departs from the observation of accentuated degradation of ecosystems
worldwide to stress the urgency in changing the patterns of occupation of the land,
production, consumption and the ecological and ethical goals of environmental conservation.
Aiming to achieve these ends, this article proposes the acknowledgement of the principle of
resilience in international environmental law. The principle of resilience is articulated herein
based on the concept of ecological resilience; the values of land ethic; and the existing
principles of international environmental law. Later, the article explains how the principle can
be applied to adaptive governance; adaptive management; environmental impact assessment;
land use legislation; and market incentives for conservation. The article concludes that the
principle of resilience is aimed at providing moral and ecological foundation for sustainable
development and a green economy; to require judges, administrators and operators of law to
consider the long-term consequences of their actions on nature and on future generations,
thereby achieving better conservation patterns on a case by case basis; to enlighten legislators
on how domestic environmental legislation can be improved; to impose an individual and
societal moral obligation to respect and improve nature, and to live in harmony with it.
Finally, the article proposes a legal framework for implementation of the principle in
domestic and international environmental law.

KEYWORDS
Land ethic – International environmental law – Ecological resilience – Environmental impact
assessment – Land use – Market incentives – Sustainable development – Green economy –
Adaptive governance
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INTRODUCTION
Scientific findings have often concluded that environmental quality levels are getting
worse despite efforts towards environmental protection. Such findings demonstrate the need
for a change in strategy towards conservation. However, changing the way humans act
towards conservation is not an easy task because (1) environmental protection deals with very
complex structures, the ecosystems; (2) conservation cannot be addressed solely by one field
of knowledge, it requires an interdisciplinary approach; (3) and because it will not be
achieved through the efforts of only one sector of society, solely government, market, or
individual citizens – it requires a conjugation of efforts among all sectors.
Since humankind started to get concerned about the degradation of nature, we focused
our attention on the preservation of specific species of fauna and flora that, for whatever
reason, inspired our attraction. Environmental laws also focused on the preservation of
landscapes that distinguished themselves by their exceptional beauty, by their importance or
because they were the remains of an almost extinct ecosystem or the habitat of some almost
extinct species1. By those means, humankind thought that, by preserving at least samples of
each ecosystem and its inhabitant species, they were conserving biodiversity. However, those
samples continued to suffer degradation, despite the efforts to guarantee stability and to keep
their original state. By studying the causes of this phenomenon, ecologists concluded that
ecosystems preserved in only a few restricted areas were collapsing because they were too
vulnerable to disturbances. They noticed that this increase in vulnerability has been occurring
since human occupation of land around the world increased in extension and intensity, as a
result of the expansion of industrialization.
But why did ecosystems get more vulnerable? Because, by eradicating species, by
polluting the environment and by changing environmental features, humankind has reduced
ecosystem resilience2. The increased vulnerability of ecosystems cause them to suffer
unpredictable changes. These changes are generally also undesirable for humankind because

1

In the United States, the preservation of specific ecosystems due to the presence of almost extinct species
started in 1972, when the Endangered Species Act was enacted.
2
Carl Folke et al, Regime Shifts, Resilience, and Biodiversity in Ecosystem Management, in FOUNDATIONS OF
ECOLOGICAL RESILIENCE 119, 142 (Lance H. Gunderson et al. eds., 2009).
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all production of services and goods, and all the features of land use rely on the predictability
of basic natural characteristics such as the frequency and intensity of rains, or the geological
solidity of mountains over which cities are built, or the chemical composition of the soil.
What increases the danger of loss of ecosystem resilience for humans and for the other
creatures that inhabit these ecosystems is that, depending on the intensity of the alteration of
an ecosystem, the change may turn out to be irreversible.
The concern about resilience is related to the questions “how do we deal with
sustainability?” and “how do we address climate change?”. The concept of ecosystem
resilience may be a new opportunity to achieve sustainability – which has been pursued
without great success since 1987, when the World Commission on Environment and
Development (also known as the Brundland Commission) popularized the term and the
definition of “sustainable development”3.
The concept of ecosystem resilience also affects how we address climate change
because, after all, if ecosystems are currently vulnerable, how are they going to resist
disturbances such as climate change and the rise in sea level? In the face of the growing
expectation and certainty that ecosystems will be seriously damaged4 and that human inaction
will only exacerbate the negative impacts of this event, humankind has begun considering
what should be done to restore ecosystem resilience and to avoid consequences of even
greater proportions.
Scientists concluded that, in order to restore ecosystem resilience, it is not enough to
preserve the ecosystem in limited tracts of land - it is necessary to preserve the ecosystem
functions, that is, the few natural mechanisms that continuously occur within an ecosystem
and that are responsible for maintaining the subsistence of its inhabitant species and the
function of the ecosystem as a whole.
The natural mechanisms on which an ecosystem relies are provided by the diversity of
species5; thus the enhancement of ecosystem resilience requires the conservation of

3

U.N. World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future, U.N. Doc. A/42/427(Aug.
4,1987).
4
See STEFFEN, W., ET AL, GLOBAL CHANGE AND THE EARTH SYSTEM: A PLANET UNDER PRESSURE (2004)
5
Carl Folke et al., Biological Diversity, Ecosystems, and the Human Scale, in FOUNDATIONS OF ECOLOGICAL
RESILIENCE, supra note 2, at 151, 154-158.
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biodiversity. In fact, this finding does not bring new challenges for the regulation of human
activities or for the relationship between humans and nature. In some way or another, humans
have always sought to maintain biodiversity because the extinction of species is condemned
both by a moral approach – which posits that we should protect species from extinction
because we can do it and it is the right thing to do – and by the utilitarian approach, which
stresses that the extinction of a species can cause disturbances in ecosystems, therefore
harming humans, or can deprive humans of valuable services, such as the cure for mortal
diseases that were hidden in some gene of the extinct species6.
In order to conserve ecosystem resilience, however, ecologists recognize that it is not
sufficient to preserve samples of each species and ecosystem in limited protected areas,
presumably to preserve biodiversity: ecosystems should be preserved everywhere7. That
finding creates a huge impact in the relationship between humans and nature because humans
are already reluctant to enforce conservation of nature in a few places, even more so to
recognize conservation of nature everywhere.
Folke, Holling and Perrings affirm that the reform of conservation institutions to make
them more adaptable to the changing needs of ecosystems’ management could contribute to
the achievement of the objective of preserving nature everywhere8.
As for institutional reform, adaptive governance coupled with adaptive management is
regarded as a strong tool to enhance the achievement of resilience when managing an
ecosystem. Adaptive governance enhances an institution’s capability to deal flexibly with new
situations, thus preparing managers for uncertainty and surprise9. Adaptive management is the
process of learning from experience by monitoring ecosystem responses to actions taken by
institutions that manage ecosystems10.
Although adaptive governance and adaptive management can be useful tools to
address resilience, they are not sufficient. The achievement of resilience requires a substantial

6

ZYGMUNT J. PLATER, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 432-434 (4th ed., 2010).
Folke et al., supra note 5, at 160; ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 190-194 (Ballantine Books
1970) (1949).
8
Folke, supra note 5, at 160.
9
Carl Folke et al., Adaptive Governance of Social-Ecological Systems, 30 ANN. REV. ENV’T RESOURCES 441, 447
(2005).
10
Barbara Cosens, Transboundary River Governance in the Face of Uncertainty, v. 30 n. 5 J. LAND RESOURCES
& ENVTL. L. 229, 238.
7
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change in the way humankind relates to nature because humans are not used to compromise
their activities according to the capacity of the ecosystem to support them. Humankind is used
to dominate, not to coexist with, nature. The inversion of this setting cannot possibly be
achieved by a simple change in management methodology: it requires a change of values.
According to Aldo Leopold, nature conservation should start first by understanding
nature and by setting the values we want conservation to have11. As the law is the tool used to
express, systematize and implement the values of organized societies, we believe that law has
a role to play in associating the concept of ecological resilience with values humankind
should adopt when developing activities that impact nature.
This discussion has exceptional importance now, at the imminence of the United
Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, to be held in Rio de Janeiro in 2012. IUCN
President Ashok Khosla mentioned that “Rio+20 needs to review 40 years of unfulfilled
commitments and explore genuine alternatives to current practices”12. The principle of
resilience developed here is envisioned by this article as one of these alternatives.
The discussion on how the law can enforce new values of conservation is expected to
go beyond 2012, in order to influence domestic law-making and decision-making in public
and private institutions alike.
This work seeks to develop the role law could play in contributing to the achievement
of ecosystem resilience. Therefore, adopting Aldo Leopold’s view of conservation, by which
the first step should be to understand nature, this article will begin with a brief explanation of
the ecological background to the concept of ecosystem resilience. Next, the article will
consider Aldo Leopold’s Land Ethic in order to discuss the values we should look for when
implementing conservation for resilience. Regarding those values and concepts, the following
part of the article will be dedicated to consolidating and contextualizing the legal principle.
In order to carry out a more detailed analysis about how the principle of resilience can
be pursued in the application of the law, this work will focus on certain sectors of
environmental law and policy making. Those sectors are: adaptive governance; adaptive

11

LEOPOLD, supra note 7, at 210.
IISD, Summary Of The Nineteenth Session Of The Commission On Sustainable Development, v.5 n.304
EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULLETIN 16 May 2011, available at http://www.iisd.ca/vol05/enb05304e.html (last
viewed Nov. 16, 2011).
12
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management; environmental impact assessment; land use and climate change adaptation; and
market mechanisms for conserving ecosystem services. The article will be based on cases
from different parts of the world. As the adoption of the concept of resilience by law seems to
be incipient in the jurisdictions of most countries, we believe that such case studies will be
helpful to any jurisdiction in the world where this concept is still not effective.
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ECOLOGICAL CONCEPT OF ECOSYSTEM RESILIENCE
Resilience is the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance, to reorganize itself and
persist. A system is resilient when, even under impacts, it is able to retain essentially the same
initial conditions, tending towards a state of equilibrium. This stable state of a system is called
the “basin of attraction,”13 “domain of attraction” or “stability domain”14.
Ecological systems have more than one stable state or basin of attraction15. The group
of basins of attraction related to the same ecosystem is called the “stability landscape”16.
When the ecosystem is already vulnerable to disruptions, and therefore less resilient, and
those disruptions force the ecosystem towards the boundaries of its current basin of attraction,
the ecosystem may cross a threshold, after which the ecosystem will present a new basin of
attraction17. When the ecosystem changes from one basin of attraction to another, or when the
ecosystem moves towards the edge of one basin of attraction, it is understood that a “change
in the stability landscape” has occurred18.
In the case of change in the stability landscape, the resilience of the system can be
considered the amount of disturbance the system can absorb before shifting into a different
configuration, in other words, shifting to a new stability domain19.
Instead of moving to another basin of attraction, the ecosystem can also remain in a
dynamic disequilibrium in which there is no global equilibrium condition and the system
moves in a catastrophic manner between stability domains20.
Some basins of attraction are more desirable than others and, in view of this, human
actors may be willing to influence the ecosystem’s movement from one basin to another by

13

Brian Walker et al, Resilience, Adaptability and Transformability in Social-Ecological Systems, 9(2): 5
ECOLOGY & SOC’Y (2004), available at http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol9/iss2/art5/.
14
Folke et al, supra note 2, at 119, 121.
15
Walker et al., supra note 13. Craig R. Allen et al., Commentary on Part One Articles, in FOUNDATIONS OF
ECOLOGICAL RESILIENCE, supra note 2, at 3, 4.
16
Walker et al., supra note 13.
17
C. S. Holling, Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems, in FOUNDATIONS OF ECOLOGICAL RESILIENCE,
supra note 2, at 19, 29, 30
18
Walker et al., supra note 13.
19
Lance H. Gunderson, et al., The Evolution of an Idea - the Past, Present, and Future of Ecological Resilience,
in FOUNDATIONS OF ECOLOGICAL RESILIENCE, supra note 2, at 423, 425.
20
C. S. Holling, The Resilience of Terrestrial Ecosystems, in FOUNDATIONS OF ECOLOGICAL RESILIENCE, supra
note 2, at 67, 92
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reinforcing the resilience of the desirable ones – and thus preventing the ecosystem from
reaching the threshold of change – or by reducing the resilience of the undesirable basin of
attraction. This collective capacity of the human actors in the system to manage resilience is
called “adaptability”21. There are some circumstances in which the ecosystem will not be able
to return to a basin of attraction, even with aid from human interference. These cases of
irreversibility of the ecosystem status may occur because of changes in the composition of
soil or air22.
Human management of natural elements is traditionally directed towards the
maintenance of the ecosystem’s stability23. This view of human interactions with the natural
world focuses on equilibrium states, on “maintaining constancy by reducing natural
variability”24.
The relationship between stability and resilience represents the natural cycle of any
ecosystem: the movement from a stage of slow accumulation of natural capital (stability)
towards sudden changes, and releases and reorganization of that released capital (resilience)25.
As the two sides of a coin, both stability and resilience are essential to maintain the
ecosystem. Besides providing the accumulation of capital, stability allows the different
elements of the ecosystem (i.e. species of fauna and flora) to enhance their organization and
connectedness. On the other hand, resilience reduces the connectedness and organization of
the elements of the ecosystem and releases the stored capital, thereby providing opportunities
for change, whereby species can reorganize themselves and find new connections among each
other, resulting in the evolution of the ecosystem as a whole.
The dynamics of ecosystem organization are very similar to the dynamics of
technological development, as pointed out by Brooks, “as a particular technology matures, it
tends to become more homogenous and less innovative and adaptive. Its very success tends to
freeze it into a mold dictated by the fear of departing from a successful formula (...)”26. The

21

Walker et al., supra note 13.
C. S. Holling, Engineering Resilience versus Ecological Resilience, in FOUNDATIONS OF ECOLOGICAL
RESILIENCE, supra note 2, at 58; Folke et al, supra note 2, at 51, 132.
23
Holling calls this tendency “engineering resilience”. Holling, supra note 22.
24
Allen et al., supra note 15, at 3.
25
Holling, supra note 22, at 52.
26
Holling, supra note 20, at 105.
22
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sudden change that occurs during resilience stimulates the ecosystem to “break the inertia”
and to innovate.
As the interchanges between stability and resilience play such an important role in the
maintenance of ecosystems, human management of ecosystems, which tends towards the
abolition of disturbances, is greatly disadvantageous. By trying to avoid disruptions such as
floods or fires, humans contribute to the construction of more vulnerable ecosystems, which
are expected to suffer even greater crisis after longer periods of time. Holling mentions an
enlightening example about the fire-combat in national parks in the United States. According
to him, the “suppression of forest fire has been remarkably successful in reducing the
probability of fire (…) but the consequence has been the accumulation of fuel to produce fires
of an extent and cost never experienced before”27.
Along the same line of reasoning, it is also recognized by Leopold that human control
over the health of the land has not been successful28. Leopold understands land as the
community that includes soil, water, plants and animals29, and health as the capacity of the
land for internal self-renewal30; therefore, very similar to the current meaning of resilience.
According to Leopold, the land is sick when soil loses its fertility, or washes away faster than
it forms, and when water systems exhibit abnormal floods and shortages31. The disappearance
of plants and animal species without visible cause despite efforts to protect them, and the
irruption of others as pests despite efforts to control them32 are symptoms of the illness of the
land.
The loss of biodiversity is both a symptom and a cause of land sickness. Every
ecosystem contains a few functions which are essential for the maintenance of the
ecosystem’s main characteristics. Those few functions are developed by a wide range of
species. Therefore, each function is developed concomitantly by several species, and this is
called redundancy33. Redundancy of function adds to the stability of systems because, even if

27

Id., at 83.
LEOPOLD, supra note 7, at 272.
29
Id., at 239.
30
Id., at 258.
31
Id., at 272.
32
Id., at 273.
33
Allen et al., supra note 15, at 14, 15.
28
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the system loses one or a few species, it may keep functioning if at least one of the species
responsible for that function remains. However, although the function remains and the
ecosystem maintains its main characteristics, the ecosystem has lost resilience, because it is
relying on one species only to develop that function. This phenomenon explains why the
ecosystem keeps working although it is very vulnerable to disturbances. It also explains why
an ecosystem that has survived the extinction of several species suddenly collapses when the
last species developing a certain function becomes extinct.
The system also loses resilience by the loss of species because the range of possible
connections among species is diminished as are the possible ways the system can reorganize
after disturbance34. By presenting fewer possibilities to innovate, the system loses much of its
capacity to adapt to changing circumstances.
Therefore, it is possible to conclude that humans reduce ecosystem resilience by
removing whole functional groups of species; by altering the magnitude, frequency, and
duration of disturbance regimes to which the biota is adapted; and by polluting the
environment, thereby changing the dynamics of climate and the composition of water, soil
and air35.
However, just as human actors can interfere in ecosystems and reduce their resilience,
in the same way they can contribute to the preservation of resilience by adopting a
conservationist approach towards nature. According to Leopold, conservation
is a state of harmony between men and land. (…) Harmony with the land is like harmony with a friend;
you cannot cherish his right hand and chop off his left. (…) The land is an organism. Its parts, like our
own parts, compete with each other and co-operate with each other. (…) You can regulate them –
cautiously – but not abolish them36.

Therefore, Leopold considers “the first principle of conservation” to be the
preservation of all the parts of the land mechanism37. In this context, “parts of the land
mechanism” may be interpreted as “functions of an ecosystem”. As scientific evidence points
out that those functions are assured by biodiversity, Folke, Holling and Perrings affirm that
the conservation of biodiversity cannot be restricted to limited protected areas; it should be

34

Garry Peterson et al., Ecological Resilience, Biodiversity, and Scale, in FOUNDATIONS OF ECOLOGICAL
RESILIENCE, supra note 2, at 167, 187.
35
Folke et al, supra note 2, at 142.
36
LEOPOLD, supra note 7, at 189, 190.
37
Id.
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addressed everywhere38. The authors explain that, although preserving biodiversity through
nature reserves may be an important short-term step, it is not sufficient to solve the problem
of biodiversity loss, because nature reserves are embedded in larger environments and species
depend on the reserves’ surrounding area to maintain themselves. According to Askins,
“small reserves lose their distinctive species if they are surrounded by a hostile landscape”39.
Ecologists highlight some measures they deem efficient for the preservation of
ecosystems’ resilience. Leopold considers that the first step towards preserving ecosystem
resilience is the collection of data about how a healthy land maintains itself as an organism.
By having this base datum of normality, science may detect what is occurring otherwise
which might provide the causes for such change. The author points out some characteristics of
healthy lands already abundantly proved by Paleontology: in healthy lands, wilderness
maintains itself for immensely long periods; species are rarely lost; and soil is built by
weather or water as fast as or faster than it is carried away to the sea. The author also calls
attention to the fact that each biotic province needs its own wilderness for comparative studies
of used and unused land, as it is impossible to study the physiology of one landscape and
apply those findings as a basis for comparison with the current status of a distinct landscape40.
Folke, Holling and Perrings consider that, in order to conserve ecosystem resilience, it
is necessary to identify the major social and economic forces that are currently driving the
loss of functional diversity, and to create incentives to redirect those forces. They propose this
to be done in two ways: by the creation of economic incentives that internalize the external
costs of biodiversity loss; and by the adoption of measures that apply the idea of preserving
biodiversity everywhere to economic analysis. According to them, “we should be stimulating
the development of institutions, policies, and patterns of human consumption and production
that work in synergy with ecosystem functions and processes”41.
Referring especially to institutions, Folke, Holling and Perrings consider the
development of effective institutions for biodiversity conservation as a precondition for the

38

Folke et al., supra note 5, at 160.
Id., (quoting R. A. Askins, Hostile landscape and the decline of migratory songbirds, SCIENCE 267:19561957).
40
LEOPOLD, supra note 7, at 274, 275
41
Folke et al., supra note 5, at 160, 161.
39
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creation of incentives to prevent the loss of functional diversity. Those institutions should be
adaptive, which means that they should be able to respond to environmental feedback before
those effects challenge the resilience of the resource base and the economic activities that
depend on it42.

42

Id.
©2011 Lia Helena Demange
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THE LAND ETHIC
Aldo Leopold’s land ethic opposes theories that consider nature as an object totally
submitted to human scrutiny. According to François Ost, the idea of nature as an object dates
back to Modernity, when Descartes and other philosophers of his time promoted a definitive
rupture between humans and nature43. With the advance of science, humans became able to
overcome obstacles to their development posed by nature. Humans acquired the belief in their
superiority over other species and over nature. From there on, humanity would use science to
understand nature’s secrets, dominate them and submit nature to human will44.
According to Christian belief, by altering the land, planting, fertilizing the soil and
erecting buildings, humans are complementing God’s creation and assuring prosperity45. It is
by working the land that humans get title to property, both over the land and over the results
of human work. According to this view, nature is no more than storage of resources46, whose
use by humans is unrestricted.
As the transformation of nature by human interference achieved greater proportions,
humankind became simultaneously geologic agent, climate actor and geo-chemical emitter,
both influencing and disturbing nature as a whole47.
In the post-war world people became aware that the planet is vulnerable; that it
contains limited resources; and that those resources are showing signs of exhaustion. François
Ost mentions the first view of Earth from space, when satellites first photographed the planet,
as the crucial moment for this realization48. This moment captures the final triumph of the
human race over natural limitations and definitely sets humans in command of “Earth craft”49
when, for the first time, they see the Earth as a fragile pearl in the vast universe. From then

43

FRANÇOIS OST, A NATUREZA ÀS MARGENS DA LEI 30 (Joana Chaves trans., Instituto Piaget ed. 1995).
Id, at 37, 39.
45
According to François Ost, when the biblical chapter Genesis does such statement, it is discretely authorizing
humans to possess parts of nature. Id., at 64.
46
Id., at 10.
47
Id., at 297, (quoting C. ALLÉGRE, ÉCONOMISER LA PLANÈTE, (1990), at 292).
48
Id., at 277-387.
49
Id., at 277, (quoting J.P. DELÉAGE, HISTOIRE DE L’ÉCOLOGIE. UNE SCIENCE DE L’HOMME ET DE LA NATURE,
(1991)), at 224.
44
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on, humans started to consider how vulnerable the planet they depend upon is and,
consequently, how vulnerable is the continued existence of the human race as a whole.
Aldo Leopold is one of the representatives of a generation which became aware of the
harm humans can cause nature by willing to dominate it. Trying to combat the causes of
human destructive behavior in relation to nature, Aldo Leopold advocates the adoption of an
ethical treatment of nature, in which humans would express their love and respect for nature.
Leopold sees this ethic as the “tendency of interdependent individuals or groups to
evolve modes of co-operation”, which ecologists call symbiosis50. This ethic started by being
associated with the relationship between individuals. Later it evolved to include the
relationship between individuals and human society. According to Leopold, a further
extension of ethics to include the relationship between individuals and land, fauna and flora is
“an evolutionary possibility and an ecological necessity”. Land has been just a property to
humans; their relationship has been strictly economic, entailing privileges but no obligations,
just as the relationship between citizens and slaves in Antiquity51.
The extension of ethics to natural elements would, on the one hand, ensure the right of
humans to manage natural resources, and on the other hand it would recognize the right of
land, water, animals and plants to continue to exist. Thereby, humans would be showing their
respect for the other members of nature’s community52.
According to Leopold, such a change of perspective requires a change in the human
position: from conqueror of the land-community to plain member and citizen of it53. The
conqueror selects which species he deems relevant and which he does not, thereby eliminating
species whose function within the ecosystem he does not fully understand. The result is
usually catastrophic, because often the realization that certain species had a main role within
the ecosystem often occurs when the species is already eliminated from that environment. By
becoming members of the land-community, humans get in harmony with nature, and this is
what Leopold considers to be the meaning of conservation54.

50

LEOPOLD, supra note 7, at 238. See also OST, supra note 43, at 290 (stating that the land humans exploit and
pollute is much more than an object, in fact, is the mother-Earth, with which we live in symbiosis).
51
LEOPOLD, supra note 7, at 239.
52
Id., at 240.
53
Id.
54
Id., at 189.
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Leopold acknowledges that we probably are not going to achieve full harmony with
the land. He places such a goal among other aspirations such as absolute justice or liberty for
people, which are important to strive for, but not necessarily achievable55.
Leopold recognizes that modern people have lost much of their connection with the
land, and this constitutes an obstacle in the way of conservation, as you cannot simply inject
the idea of striving for harmony with the land cannot simply be injected into one who has no
relationship with the land56. In order to solve this problem, Leopold recognizes the need for
education in conservation, which should be primarily based on promoting curiosity about land
mechanisms and building ethical support for land economics. The author believes that, if this
is set in place, conservation will naturally follow.
The lack of education in conservation and knowledge about land mechanisms is also
an obstacle for to the development of a land ethic. For Leopold, the establishment of an
ethical relationship with land requires love, respect and admiration and a high regard for
land’s value. A person cannot love, respect and admire something he or she does not know.
That is why the land ethic requires some understanding of ecology. It also requires social
approbation of right actions and social disapproval of wrong actions. According to Leopold,
the path to determine the “right” and the “wrong” actions is the following:
Quit thinking about decent land-use as solely an economic problem. Examine each question in terms of
what is ethically and esthetically right, as well as what is economically expedient. A thing is right when
it tends to preserve integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. it is wrong when it tends
otherwise.57

Leopold says that, without an ethical relationship with nature, conservationists are
obliged to look for economic values to justify efforts to conserve natural elements. Therefore,
people strive to identify how a function developed by certain species can help human
economic activities and how the loss of such service provided by nature would harm the
economy.
By recognizing the role of economic values in ecological functions in trying to
conserve some species, Leopold calls attention to the conservation of species that are not
useful to the economy, either because their function is still unknown or because their function

55

Id., at 210.
Id.
57
Id., at 262.
56
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supports the ecosystem as a whole, but not a specific human activity. According to him,
conservation directed by the market does not cover such species, and this can result in their
extinction and therefore in an increase the vulnerability of an ecosystem58.
Another problem of conservation as driven by markets is that it does not provide an
education for conservation. People take measures towards conservation as long as they are
going to receive something in return. As soon as the economic incentive is withdrawn, the
conservation measure is discontinued. Market incentives for conservation also fail to promote
a sense of right and wrong. Even though contributing to conservation, the individual who
receives a payment to conserve a species or an ecosystem service is driven by self-interest,
not by a sense of obligation or by the sense that it is the right thing to do59.
Leopold believes that economic incentives for conservation also present the problem
of depending too much on government for implementation. He believes that expecting that
governments will be able to promote conservation everywhere through economic incentives
or even with traditional regulation is to raise expectations to a level that exceeds
governments’ possibilities. Governments have inherent limitations and cannot be everywhere
all the time. In such a context, by internalizing in people the sense of right or wrong in
relation to nature, the land ethic would promote conservation even where governments cannot
reach60.
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ECOSYSTEM RESILIENCE IN THE LAW
The law is the system employed by organized societies to declare, systematize and
implement the essential values of a society. The law contains certain inherent characteristics
and methods that can lead to innovative solutions to common problems. As mentioned by
François Ost61, the law operates by systematically considering all relevant points of view,
putting them in proportion and comparing them. Most importantly, in an ideal situation, the
law is capable of taking into account all pertinent facts and divergent interests, balancing
them, and reaching a reasonable and desirably just decision62.
The capacity to balance divergent interests is being introduced more and more in the
elaboration of policies and decisions by agencies through the advent of “public participation
in decision making”. Although inserting public participation in such matters is necessary for
democratic governance and for preventing social and environmental damage caused by the
implementation of ill-planned policies, mechanisms for public participation are mostly not
binding and are restricted to the procedural obligation of hearing divergent interests.
Therefore, the agency usually is obliged to hear the interested parties, but not to take their
concerns into account when reaching a decision; this obligation remains exclusively reserved
to the Judicial branch.
Even when agencies are able to provide substantive public participation in decision
making, they cannot accomplish the task of defending the interests of those who are not
present in the process: nature itself and the future generations. Differently, the law can ensure
representation of those interests during its weighing and balancing process, especially if so
directed by a legal principle.
Due to the need to enforce consideration of all the interests at stake and the interest of
nature itself and of future generations, management for resilience, so called adaptive
management, cannot be implemented solely by agencies and executive planning and
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procedures; it requires the guidance of a legal principle and enforcement by the Judicial
branch.
This article will analyze how environmental law may influence human decisions
guided towards the achievement of ecosystem resilience. It will do so by consolidating a new
principle of law, the principle of resilience, and by applying this principle to relevant areas of
environmental law.

The origins and content of the principle of resilience
The concept of ecological resilience radically changes the manner by which
humankind manages natural resources because it annuls the premise that management should
seek stability. In order to guide the public administration and individuals in dealing with this
change of mindset, this article proposes consolidation of the principle of resilience as a new
principle of international law.
As will be demonstrated in this topic and in the topic “The principle of resilience in
International Environmental Law”, the foundations of the principle of resilience already exist
in International Environmental Law. It is already buried within other principles of
environmental law. However, it must be acknowledged and must become an independent
principle in order to guide humankind on how to stop degradation of global nature and how to
attend to growing population needs in the context of climate change and other natural
disturbances in a manner that will stop degradation and strengthen global nature.
The importance of systematizing a new principle to address ecosystem resilience relies
on the function principles exercise in the international sphere. Principles of international law
designate fundamental legal norms and values that should be pursued by the whole
international environmental law system. Principles also indicate essential characteristics of
legal institutions, and provide the rationale for the law and the general orientation to which
positive law must conform63. The principle may be included in States’ practices and in
national laws, and may be referenced by judges as guidance for interpreting or filling the gaps
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in national or subnational law. It provides a framework for negotiating and implementing
new and existing agreements and may be incorporated in legally binding international
instruments. Moreover, it provides the rules of decision for resolving transboundary
environmental disputes. Finally, the principle may assist the integration of international
environmental law into other fields of international law64.
But what would be the meaning of the principle of resilience?
Several factors would influence the shape of such a principle, including: the ecological
concept of resilience; the link between management of ecosystems and resilience; the values
that the human community wants conservation to have; and the existing principles and
concepts of environmental law, especially the concept of intergenerational equity.
From the ecological concept of resilience we conclude that resilience requires the
preservation of biodiversity and the preservation of nature everywhere. Keeping in mind that
the goal of preserving biodiversity for resilience is to keep the functions of the ecosystem and
the land mechanism working with their original quality, we conclude that resilience requires
biodiversity to be preserved in its original habitat and that each species be represented by a
quantity of individuals sufficient to ensure the execution of the ecosystem function they are
responsible for65.
As previously mentioned, the goal of preserving nature everywhere brings quite a
challenge to environmental conservation. Some may argue that nature conservation is already
done everywhere, because environmental laws are applied in the whole territory of a
country’s jurisdiction. In favor of such argument, it is possible to argue that environmental
law regulates not only reserved protected areas, but also the use of natural resources outside
protected areas, in landscapes that have been intensively transformed by humans and where
the emission of pollutants may threaten human health and environmental quality, or where the
killing of a certain species can cause the extinction of that species.
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There are no doubts about the validity of such arguments. However, we should have in
mind that when we discuss resilience we are not talking about the maintenance of some
natural resources everywhere; we are talking about the preservation of the whole land
mechanism everywhere. The concept of resilience is based on the idea that every land
mechanism – that means, every ecosystem function and every natural element of an
ecosystem (which includes fauna, flora and inanimate elements) – is important to keep the
ecosystem resilience. Therefore, such thinking requires a much more complex and broader
view of conservation than the one currently applied to non-reserve-protected areas, where
environmental law is very segmentally applied to preserve some individual endangered
species or just the inanimate elements of the environment (soil, water and air). As
conservation seeks to preserve very complex structures such as ecosystems, it is not possible
to attribute to conservation a simplistic or segmented view. Conservation for resilience must
take into account the interconnections between the various components of an ecosystem and it
must include in the concept of “land” not only the forests and preserved landscapes, but also
the landscapes intensely modified by humans.
The dichotomy that determines a place for nature, where conservation is needed, and a
place for humans, where conservation is not needed, must be abolished. Humans are part of
nature and nature is everywhere. And if it is not everywhere, it should be. It should be in the
cities, in the houses, in the industries, keeping the ecosystem functions alive, interconnecting
the elements of the natural world. If every house in a city has a garden with the same species
that compose the ecosystem in which the city is located, the fauna and flora present in each
garden may interconnect with each other and keep the functions which make that ecosystem
unique. The wider the area where nature is conserved and the more connections with fauna
and flora are kept, the more resilient the ecosystem will be.
Along this line of reasoning, the concept of ecological resilience nurtured the concept
of the “social-ecological” system, which emphasizes the interconnectivity between humans
and nature and stresses that the delineation between social and ecological systems is artificial
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and arbitrary since social-ecological systems have powerful reciprocal feedbacks and act as
complex adaptive systems66. The concept of adaptive governance is based on this premise.
In order to determine the values that conservation for resilience should have, this work
will be based on the values promoted by Aldo Leopold in land ethic. Therefore, the principle
of resilience is guided by the aspiration of getting in harmony with the land - all the land, not
just some elements of it. According to the principle of resilience, humans are members of the
land-community, not conquerors of it, and they should get to know the land mechanism as
much as possible, in order to respect and love the land. This principle also includes social
approbation of actions that tend to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic
community, and social disapproval for actions that tend otherwise. The principle refuses to
address land-use as a solely economic issue and to rely only on the government or on the
market to take conservation measures.
Aldo Leopold also believes that humankind should cultivate love and respect for the
land mechanism. Based on this statement, this article interprets the land ethic as requiring
humans to enhance the land mechanism the maximum they can, and not to merely prevent
and mitigate the aggressions imposed upon nature that the law mandates individuals to
address. That means that besides the legal obligation to do no harm to the environment,
humans have the ethical obligation to improve environmental quality.
By improving the environment wherever possible, we humans demonstrate that we are
conscious of the burden we inflict on the land mechanism; we respect the land mechanism
that supports our existence; and we assume our ethical responsibility to aid the land
mechanism in any way we can in return for what it provides us. This duty is not only
individual, but also societal.
The ethical obligation to live in harmony with the environment and to improve
environmental resilience characterizes an ethical principle. According to Taylor, to be
considered so, a moral principle must present six formal characteristics67: it must be general in
form, meaning that its applicability is not restricted to a limited group of people, rather, it is
addressed to the global audience; it must be universally applicable to all moral agents,
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meaning that the rule cannot defeat itself if everyone attempts to comply with it; it must be
intended to be applied disinterestedly, meaning that compliance with the principle is required
even when it is against the moral agent’s interest; it must be advocated as a principle for all to
adopt, meaning that whoever adopts it approves its adoption by all others; it must override all
non-moral norms or concerns.
One of the major aims of the principle of resilience is to provide guidelines for a
governmental policy pursuant of the maxim: “Do not solely mitigate: improve”. In order to
improve the environment and at the same time ensure essential economic activities, the
principle of resilience will push governments towards innovative environmental management
solutions that proportionately balance environmental and economic activities, in order to do
not prioritize one interest and suffocate the other. Such solutions are called “innovative”
because they provide new guidelines for the operation of the law; for example, by stimulating
different patterns of production and consumption, or different governmental goals, or unusual
rules for land use and planning.
Incorporating the background provided by ecology and ethics, the principle of
resilience can be established as follows:
•

The land mechanism has inherent value.

•

Every person has the right to use natural resources as long as such use does not
impair the use by others or the persistence of the original setting of mutually
reinforcing processes and structures of an ecosystem.

•

Every person has the moral duty to respect nature and to pursue a way of living in
harmony with the land mechanism.

•

In order to ensure ecosystem resilience to natural or human-made disturbances, the
human management of natural or urban landscapes shall preserve ecosystem
functions through:
o the preservation of all species everywhere;
o the preservation of natural cycles;
o and the preservation of chemical composition of soil, air and water.

•

The lack of scientific understanding regarding the function of land mechanisms and
the role developed by single species in such mechanisms shall not be used as a reason
for postponing cost-effective measures to enhance ecosystem resilience.
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•

States shall ensure that the younger generation receives education on the function of
natural mechanisms and that the government officials receive training in identifying
human activities and natural phenomena that may impact ecosystem resilience.

•

Governments are responsible for identifying the factors that put ecosystem resilience
at risk and addressing such factors.

•

Management for resilience requires the adoption of adaptive management techniques,
or other techniques that comprise monitoring of results, evaluation of policy
performance and review of policy measures according to the assessment of results and
changes of circumstances.

•

Patterns of production and consumption in synergy with ecosystem function shall be
stimulated.

•

The resilience of ecosystems shall be considered in the assessment of costs and
benefits of any activity or policy that affects the environment.

The principle of resilience in International Environmental Law
Basic elements of the principle of resilience are already present in international
environmental law.
The Preamble of the Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment, 1972, recognizes that protection and improvement of the human
environment is the duty of all Governments68. The enhancement of resilience is a matter of
protecting and improving the environment and that is why Governments have the duty to
consider resilience when managing natural resources.
Principle 1 of the Stockholm Declaration declares that “man … bears a solemn
responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and future generations”.
Therefore, the duty to improve the environment is not solely governmental, but also
individual.
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The first part of Principle 1969 of the Stockholm Declaration highlights the role
education for conservation has to play in protecting and improving the environment.
The World Charter for Nature, 198270, contains several elements of the principle of
resilience. Among the principles of conservation, it proclaims that:
Preamble: every form of life is unique, warranting respect regardless of its worth to man, and, to accord
other organisms such recognition, man must be guided by a moral code of action
1. Nature shall be respected and its essential processes shall not be impaired…
4. Ecosystems and organisms … shall be managed to achieve and maintain optimum sustainable
productivity, but not in such a way as to endanger the integrity of those other ecosystems or species
with which they coexist…
6. In the decision-making process it shall be recognized that man’s needs can be met only by ensuring
the proper functioning of natural systems …
9. The allocation of areas of the earth to various uses shall be planned, and due account shall be taken
of the physical constraints, the biological productivity and diversity and the natural beauty of the
areas concerned.
10. (d) Non-renewable resources which are consumed as they are used shall be exploited with
restraint, taking into account … the compatibility of their exploitation with the functioning of
natural systems.
11. (d) Agriculture, grazing, forestry and fisheries practices shall be adapted to the natural
characteristics and constraints of given areas;
11. (e) Areas degraded by human activities shall be rehabilitated for purposes in accord with their
natural potential and compatible with the well-being of affected populations.
15. Knowledge of nature shall be broadly disseminated by all possible means, particularly by
ecological education as an integral part of general education.
19. The status of natural processes, ecosystems and species shall be closely monitored to enable early
detection of degradation or threat, ensure timely intervention and facilitate the evaluation of
conservation policies and methods.

The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 1992, recognizes that human
beings are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature (Principle 1). At
Principle 4, the Declaration determines that environmental protection shall constitute an
integral part of the development process and cannot be considered in isolation from it. At
Principle 8, the Declaration guides States to reduce and eliminate unsustainable patterns of
production and consumption71.
The need to build ecosystem resilience not only to reduce the risk of disaster, but also
due to its importance in providing sustainable livelihoods, flow of goods and services and
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reducing vulnerability to climate change is explicitly expressed in international documents,
such as the United Nations, 2009 Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction72.
Foundations of the principle of resilience can also be found in other principles of
international environmental law.
The principle of sustainable development requires present generation to meet its needs
“without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”73. This idea
requires humankind to stop exploiting natural resources at a rate greater than their capacity for
regeneration, the so called sustainable yield. However, despite the recognition of sustainable

development as a basic principle of environmental protection and national planning, humans
still consider that they have the right to take from nature a little more than the sustainable
yield threshold, thereby gambling with nature.
The sustainable development movement did not succeed in inserting in people’s minds
the idea that ensuring continuity of natural resources is more important than individual shortterm profit. Neither did it convince people that personal ambition has to yield in face of
environmental limitations or the survival of future generations will be at risk.
By trying to please all concurring interests at once, the sustainable development
movement did not make it clear that, in order to keep the “health of the land”, humans often
need to prioritize values and goals, which not so rarely will result in restricting economic
activities and economic growth where the land mechanism cannot support it any longer. The
implicit meaning commonly attributed to “sustainable development” by business and even by
countries is that private initiative will protect the environment as long as such protection does
not impair economic activity. While the sustainable development movement succeeds on
raising awareness about the need to conciliate environmental protection and development, it
fails to provide guidance on the following ethical questions: when economic activity and
environmental protection cannot be conciliated, which interest should be prioritized and under
what circumstances? The vacuum left by the concept of sustainable development is repeatedly
filled by business interests, who have a quick answer at the tip of the tongue to the
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abovementioned question: economic growth ALWAYS has priority over environmental
protection concerns.
Such an omission leaves the establishment of priorities to be determined on a case by
case basis, with no overarching directive guideline. Thereby, the legal framework has
assigned an equal treatment both to environmental and economic interests. However, such
“equal” treatment hides a fundamental injustice when one considers that environmental and
economic interests are not balanced because the latter counts on much greater political power.
Therefore, following the lesson given by Aristotle, the aspiration for justice requires the law
to treat equally the equals and unequally whoever is in an unequal position74. This primary
function of the legal system can be developed by the application of the principle of resilience,
which fills the vacuum left by the sustainable development concept by advocating that
ecosystem resilience and continual provision of ecological functions must be preserved, even
if it requires a reduction of economic growth and economic profits. Thus, the principle of
resilience prioritizes environmental protection, artificially balancing a situation that is
naturally unbalanced. By this means, the principle of resilience improves the legal system as a
whole by correcting an ongoing injustice in the management of natural resources and planning
for development.
The principle of resilience does not acknowledge rules for prioritizing concurring
interests solely because it is necessary to enforce sustainable development under an ethical
and legal point of view: it does so also because it is a factual necessity. Several works
affirmed that human society has to learn how to develop socially and manage natural
resources without relying on economic growth75. Such works reinforce the need to give
priority to environmental protection when it is not possible to conciliate it with economic
growth. Considering the green economy’s goal to generate wealth through sustainable
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exploitation aiming to eradicate poverty76, the idea of developing without growth should
apply to developed countries and countries that have already accumulated enough wealth to
combat poverty. The green economy cannot be green if deprived of the understanding that the
economy should be kept in a steady state if economic growth cannot be achieved within the
limits imposed by the sustainable yield of natural resources.
The concept of common concern of humankind, for example, determines that, as the
planet is ecologically interdependent, humanity has a common interest in protecting the
environment and may have a collective interest in certain activities that take place, or
resources that are located, wholly within State boundaries77. Therefore, as a consequence of
this concept, States share the responsibility not to cause harm to issues of common concern
and to address common concerns78. By attributing common responsibilities and interests to all
States, this concept creates obligations erga omnes both to prevent and to address the harm
done to common concerns. Those obligations have procedural implications, as explained by
Kiss & Shelton:
In traditional international law, only an injured state could bring a claim against the state which caused
the injury in violation of international law. Where the common interest is infringed, however, all states
may be considered to have suffered a legal injury, with the obligations designated as obligations owing
to all states, i.e., as obligations erga omnes.79

Although the concept encloses an important procedural consequence, the downside of
classifying the protection of the environment as a whole as a common interest is that it
attributes a strong legal classification to too broad a subject, which has the negative effect of
non-compliance. The principle of resilience can have an important role to play in this regard
by providing a more detailed interpretation of the concept of the common concern of
humankind. This interpretation would show that the object of the common concern of
humankind is the preservation of ecosystem functions and the preservation of biodiversity in a
space as extensive as possible.
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The concept of intergenerational equity focuses on future generations as rightful
beneficiaries of environmental protection. It encloses the notion of fairness both among the
individuals of the present generation and between present and future generations. The concept
of intergenerational equity is composed of three elements: conservation of the diversity of
natural and cultural resources by maintaining alternative resources within each category;
conservation of environmental quality by preventing the exhaustion of higher quality
resources; and equitable or nondiscriminatory access to Earth’s resources80. This last element
guides the distribution of access to natural resources both for present and future generations.
As for the conservation of diversity and the quality of resources, the aim is to implement
equitable access to resources by guaranteeing future generations’ capacity of choice among
alternative resources, and by guaranteeing access by future generations to resources of the
same level of quality as the resources exploited by present generations.
This concept requires that present generations use the resources sustainably and avoid
irreversible environmental damage81. In this context, the principle of resilience increases the
applicability of the concept of intergenerational equity by restraining the present generation
from weakening a non-resilient ecosystem. As mentioned before, a non-resilient ecosystem is
so vulnerable to disturbances that, when passing through movements between basins of
attraction, the passage to a new basin of attraction may be irreversible and the regeneration of
the original features of an ecosystem may be impossible.
Furthermore, the principle of resilience contributes to the application of the second
component of the concept of intergenerational equity – the conservation of environmental
quality – by requiring the preservation of integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic
community.
The precautionary principle prescribes the need for taking anticipatory actions in order
to avoid environmental harms, even when the scientific understanding of a specific threat is
not yet complete. The principle of resilience also contributes to the implementation of the
precautionary principle: first, because it seeks to enhance the resilience of ecosystems in order
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to prevent their vulnerability and degradation; and, second, because it proposes the
conservation of all ecosystem functions, even those that are not yet fully understood.
The principle of non-regression determines that the creation of norms that contribute
to the degradation of the environment is considered a violation of several international
instruments whose aim is to protect the environment82.
The principle of non-regression is based on three theoretical elements. First, it is based
on the assumption that environmental law seeks to prevent the degradation of the environment
by constantly improving environmental quality. Second, it is based on the premise that the
present generation cannot impose its laws on future generations. According to Michel Prieur,
if present generations gradually adopt less protective environmental laws, they will prevent
future generations from fully exercising their right to a healthy life83. Third, the principle of
regression relies on the application of the concept of intangibility of human rights to
environmental regulation. The concept of the intangibility of human rights is implicit in
human rights conventions and stands against the regression of those rights. It is transposed to
environmental law because of the effect that the degradation of environmental laws may have
on the exercise of human rights.
The principle of non-regression, in national law, guides the creation of norms by both
the Legislative and the Executive branches and is enforced by adjudicatory authorities, which
are responsible for the control of the legitimacy of acts perpetrated by the other Powers.
The principle of resilience can assist the application of the principle of non-regression
by providing guidelines to assist judges in determining whether a norm represents regression
of environmental conservation or not.
Some may argue that the principle of resilience would be redundant and dispensable in
guiding judges in deciding whether a norm increases or decreases the level of environmental
protection because the principle provides the same criteria that could be provided in court by
ecologists’ testimonies. However, this kind of criticism constitutes an incomplete
interpretation of the principle of resilience by considering solely the ecological aspect of the
principle. This argument fails to realize that the principle of resilience comprehends not only
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an ecological concept, but also the relation of the ecological concept to the law and to the
ethics that govern the relationship between humankind and nature. The principle of resilience
commits the ecological concept of resilience to the protection of future generations’ interests
and to the ethical goal of living in harmony with nature. This principle also introduces the
concept of ecological resilience to the legal framework not as a mere judicial finding based on
scientific data, but as a full legal principle of environmental law, which, as such, must be used
to guide the creation and the interpretation of any environmental norms or any policies or
norms that generate environmental consequences.
The principle of non-regression is truly effective in achieving improvement of
environmental quality only if it is applied to all norms that generate consequences to the
environment. In other words, the principle of non-regression should be applied not only to
environmental, but also to economic, policies and norms that affect the environment, and the
same applies to the principle of resilience.
The principle of resilience is also strongly influenced by three environmental
principles that deal with governance for conservation: the subsidiarity principle; the public
participation principle; and the principle of good neighborliness and duty to cooperate. These
three principles guarantee the participation of local levels of government, the affected public
and the international community in the decision-making process related to environmental
issues.
The subsidiarity principle reflects a preference for making decisions at the lowest level
of government or social organization where the issue can be effectively managed. This
principle has a procedural nature: it determines the level of the policy-making hierarchy in
which the decision should be made, but it does not guide the kind of decision that should
result. The final decision will be taken not only by balancing local interests, but also by
balancing national or international priorities.
The public participation principle exists because environmental issues are best handled
by the participation of all concerned citizens at the relevant level. However, individuals
cannot appropriately participate in decision making if they do not receive the relevant
information on the issue. Therefore, the public has the right of access to information held by
public authorities regarding the environment, and the State has the duty to encourage public
awareness and participation by making information available. In order to exercise their right,
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individuals should also have equal access to justice, through the judicial and administrative
proceedings provided by the State.
The principle of good neighborliness and duty to cooperate determines that
international environmental issues be handled in a cooperative spirit by all countries84. This
principle is binding because it derives from a general principle expressed in Article 1.3 of the
United Nations Charter, which sets among the purposes of the United Nations the
achievement of international cooperation in solving international problems.
The three above mentioned principles for environmental governance are very relevant
for the achievement of ecosystem resilience especially because they expand the range of
stakeholders involved in efforts for conservation. Such principles abolish the idea that
environmental conservation is to be promoted only by national governments. Therefore, the
application of these principles prevents the situation criticized by Aldo Leopold whereby
conservation efforts implemented only by the government are deficient because they do not
internalize in the public the ethical value of conservation and because they only reach places
where the governmental structure is present.
The principle of resilience is also an essential part of the duty to assess the
environmental impact of proposed activities, policies, or programs to integrate environmental
issues into development planning. Before implementing activities or policies, the State has the
duty to fully identify and consider their environmental effects and to give the affected citizens
the opportunity to understand the proposed project and to express their opinions about it
through public participation in decision making.
As the duty of the State is to fully identify and consider environmental effects, it is
very clear that such a duty applies to the identification and consideration of any impact the
project may cause to the resilience of the ecosystem. From this conclusion it is extracted that
the governmental entities must understand the concept of ecological resilience and must be
trained to include assessment of impacts on ecosystem resilience in the environmental impact
assessment. In order to fully exercise their right to participation in decision making,
individuals and citizen organizations should also seek to understand the meaning of
ecosystem resilience.
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The implementation of the principle of resilience through the use of environmental
impact assessment procedures will be considered in greater detail in the section of this article
“Applying the principle of resilience”.

Legal status of principles of International Environmental Law
The principles of international environmental law have their origins in a wide variety
of sources, which include: environmental treaties; soft law instruments; the United Nations
General Assembly Resolutions; arbitral decisions; judicial decisions of the International Court
of Justice; expert commentary85; application of general principles of international law to
environmental issues86; and customary international law87.
Soft law instruments88, the United Nations General Assembly Resolutions, and expert
commentary do not bind States. Arbitral and judicial decisions bind only the States under
litigation and only if such States accept the jurisdiction of the arbitral commission or of the
International Court of Justice. Environmental treaties may create obligations to signatory
States. General principles of international law create binding obligations to all States.
According to UNEP, the legal status of international environmental law principles and
concepts is varied: some are firmly established, others are emerging and gradually gaining
acceptance; some have the nature of guidelines or policy directives and do not give rise to
specific rights and obligations. The juridical effect of principles and concepts may change
from one legal system to another, depending on the context of the case, the activity at issue,
the actors and the geographical region89. In other words, environmental principles and
concepts may be binding or not binding, depending on the circumstances of the case, on the
countries involved and on the nature of the principle or concept.
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Both binding and non-binding principles of international environmental law play
primarily a role of anticipation rather than reaction to environmental problems90. In other
words, the true purpose and capability of international environmental norms is to prevent
environmental hazards on a global scale, not to punish States that violate these norms. As a
matter of fact, this tendency is noticeable not only in international environmental law, but also
in public international law as a whole.
Common obligations of international environmental law can be shared by all the
States when they have an erga omnes characteristic, or when these obligations can be shared
by several States, when they are established by multilateral agreements. The target of such
obligations is to diffuse potential threats to the world as a whole, rather than to a specifically
injured State. There is some controversy among the experts whether each State has an
automatic right to react on behalf of the common interest against any breach of common
obligations.
Benedetto Conforti argues that States not directly injured by the violation of the
international obligation are not automatically entitled to react. This is different from directly
injured countries, which have the right to seek measures such as reparation and reprisal91. On
the other hand, Oscar Schachter states that every party to a multilateral agreement would have
a sufficient legal interest to sustain standing to redress92.
The differences in the analyses promoted by both authors are motivated by their
different focus: Conforti focuses on countries’ reactions to violation of international law,
which include self-help measures; on the other hand, Schachter limits his interpretation to the
judicial reaction, stating that uninjured countries would have sufficient legal standing to bring
claims on behalf of the common interest.
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As noted by Michel Prieur in an interview given to a Brazilian journal93, the current
punishment for a violation of an international obligation regarding environmental issues
hardly goes beyond moral condemnation or the symbolic finding of violation. This is due to
the nonexistence of a court of justice specializing in international environmental crimes.
Summarizing, although countries not injured directly have no right to pursue unilateral
measures to react to a violation of international environmental law, they have standing to
bring claims to adjudication. However, as there is not yet an appropriate court where such
claims can be filled, the violation of international environmental norms remains largely
susceptible to mere moral and political condemnation.
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APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF RESILIENCE
The applicability of the principle to sectors of a country’s legal system requires the
prior development of a conceptual framework for decision-making based on the principle of
resilience.
Any country seeking to apply the principle of resilience needs, first of all, to recognize
it as a moral principle. Therefore, the country must recognize the inherent value of nature and
guide its decisions towards the accomplishment of the goal to live in harmony with nature.
As noted by Aldo Leopold, the goal to live in harmony with nature is not necessarily
achievable, but it is something we should strive for94. Also, it is useful to remember that the
acceptance of the goal to live in harmony with the land mechanism as a moral principle
presupposes that compliance with this duty is required even when it is against the moral agent
interest95.
Employing the principle of resilience in decision-making requires that it be recognized
as a legal principle, after it has been recognized as a moral principle. In order to ensure
enforceability of the legal principle, it is important to incorporate it into a Code or into a
country’s framework environmental legislation. A country’s framework environmental
legislation represents “an integrated, ecosystem-oriented legal regime that permits a holistic
view of the ecosystem, the synergies and interactions within it, and the linkages in
environmental stresses and administrative institutions”96, which is precisely what the
implementation of the principle of resilience requires.
After being acknowledged in a statute, the legislature or the resource management
institutions should create a procedure for the implementation of the principle of resilience. It
is recommended that the government analyze where the principle of resilience can be
incorporated into existing procedures related to legal protection of the environment. The
recommendations addressed in the section dedicated to Environmental Impact Assessment
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and to the incorporation of adaptive management into the circle of risk management
(Adaptive Management section) are good examples of how this can be done.
In other circumstances, the fulfillment of the principle of resilience’s aims will require
the creation of new procedures. The organization of workshops for adaptive management and
the creation of development rights to address the loss of real property to the sea in coastal
areas (Land use section) are examples of innovations in procedural rules.
Besides incorporating the principle of resilience into procedural rules, the government
should set penalties for lack of compliance with these rules. As for penalties for
noncompliance with the principle of resilience, it is interesting to note that the concept of
ecological resilience reveals another level of environmental degradation: the destruction of
ecosystem resilience. When the action perpetrated by a project is responsible for eliminating
the resilience of an already vulnerable ecosystem, the damage this project caused to the
environment is much graver than the damage produced by the same action in a resilient
ecosystem. For example, if a project is responsible for eradicating one single pollinizer
species, the consequence of this impact will be much graver for an ecosystem that counts on
no other species to fulfill the pollination function than in an ecosystem that has many other
species providing this service.
In this context, a pertinent question for the legislator would be: should the penalty for
whoever destroys the resilience of a certain ecosystem be greater than the penalty applied to
whoever perpetrates the same action, but does not produce this result?
In setting the penalties, legislators should seek to employ the penalty as a means to
achieve concrete results in improving environmental quality through measures of education
for environmental conservation; restoration of an ecosystem’s resilience; collection of
information for adaptive management; enhancement of sustainable consumption and
production patterns.
These kinds of goals are found in the Writ of Kalikasan, in the Philippines. This writ
was created to enforce the individual constitutional right to a “balanced and healthful
ecology”. The remedy can be claimed by any natural or judicial person acting on behalf of
persons whose environmental right was or is in danger of being violated. The writ awards no
damages to individual petitioners; rather its reliefs include directing the respondent to
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permanently cease the action or activity that gave cause to the violation of environmental
laws; and to restore the environment97.
In the State of Amazonas Environmental Court in Manaus, in Brazil, alternative
penalties have been proposed by Judge Adalberto Carim Antonio to violators of
environmental laws, according to the transgressions. Instead of jail or fines, respondents can
opt to restore the environment and to bring additional benefits to the affected community, to
take classes in environmental education, or to act as volunteers in environmental protection
organizations, among many other innovative penalties98.
In order to ensure compliance with the principle, governments should establish who
will enforce attainment to the principle guidance and to its procedural rules. The enforcement
can be provided by citizen suit provisions, by environmental courts, or by a specific
governmental institution vested with special rights to sue violators - such as the Brazilian
Ministério Público99.

Adaptive governance
Adaptive governance is a method that employs the understanding of how ecological
resilience works to the governance of decision making within resource management
institutions, thereby enhancing the mutual influence of social and ecological systems. That is
why adaptive governance seeks to increase the adaptability of the social actors in order to
enhance their capacity to reorganize social systems within desired states in response to
disturbing events, such as changing environmental conditions100.
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“Adaptive governance conveys multi-objective reality when handling conflicts among
diverse stakeholders and, at the same time, adapts this social problem to resolve issues
concerning dynamic ecosystems”101. In the end, adaptive governance orients how decisions
will be made having in regard the information collected by adaptive management and the
divergent social interests influencing certain issues whose roots are social and resource
management related.
The adoption of patterns of consumption and production that work in synergy with
ecosystem functions and processes is an application of adaptive governance. In this matter,
the example of the project “Alcântara: sustainable city”102, in Brazil may be mentioned. In
this project, the aim of enhancing the economic growth of the city was joined to the concern
of producing a commodity that would improve ecosystem quality and the functioning of
society. Due to the national potential for producing biofuels, ethanol was the commodity
chosen to boost Alcântara’s economic growth. However, instead of using the rural area of
Alcântara to introduce crops of sugar cane, which are not native and are not adapted to the
local ecosystem, the project’s proponents decided to produce ethanol from “maripuera”, a
byproduct of the local production of cassava flour, which contains cyanide. Instead of merely
developing an economic activity with the least impact on the surrounding ecosystem, this
project actually improved the environmental quality of the region, as the cyanide had
previously been dumped anywhere to seep into the ground.
Adaptive governance in international law

Adaptive governance is an efficient way of implementing Principles 17 and 13 of the
Stockholm Declaration, which deal with governance for enhancing environmental quality.
Principle 17 declares that “appropriate national institutions must be entrusted with the task of
planning, managing, or controlling the environmental resources of States with the view to
enhancing environmental quality”. Principle 13 declares that “States should adopt …
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development planning so as to ensure that development is compatible with the need to protect
and improve the human environment”103.
There are now discussions about introducing some features of adaptive governance
techniques into institutions on the international level. The need for a flexible institutional
framework for sustainable development in order to address new and emerging issues has been
recognized by most of the countries attending the Second Preparatory Meeting of the United
Nations Convention on Sustainable Development of 2012104. Many countries called for:
greater participation of stakeholders in the environmental institutional framework; integration
of mechanisms at the national, regional and international levels; and enhanced coordination
and cooperation among all international organizations, agencies and conventions to ensure
implementations of commitments and promote synergies105. Such intentions show a clear
trend toward shaping international environmental governance according to the propositions of
adaptive governance.
The trend towards the adoption of adaptive governance at the international level is
stressed by the intent of several countries to strengthen the monitoring of policies and
programs aimed at implementing multilateral environmental agreements. Such an intent is
expressed by the countries’ statement in favor of the enhancement of the United Nations
Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), which is seen as the only forum in which
sustainable development is addressed in an integrated fashion106. CSD is responsible for
reviewing and monitoring progress in the implementation of Agenda 21 and the Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, as well as providing policy guidance to follow
up the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation at local, national, regional and international
levels107.
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Adaptive governance in domestic law

Adaptive governance is profoundly influenced by a country’s approach to decisionmaking. The relationship of the principle of resilience to the main approaches to decisionmaking is analyzed below.

Cost-benefit Analysis

The cost-benefit approach provides that government agencies conduct a cost-benefit
analysis (CBA) before enacting major regulation. CBA requires a quantitative and qualitative
accounting of the effects of regulation, in which the reasons for action must be explained
when costs exceed benefits. CBA is based on the premise that the accounting of regulation
effects can give citizens and officials a full sense of what is at stake when making
decisions108.
CBA seeks to test the efficiency of government actions. Efficiency is the term
employed by Economy to designate economic transactions that generate greater benefits than
costs to society. Economic efficiency provides us with criteria to evaluate the functioning of
government109, because regulation and governmental decisions are unlikely to promote social
welfare if the costs are high and the benefits are low110. Therefore, CBA avoids the diversion
of government resources from their most beneficial uses to less beneficial ones111.
Besides evaluating and enhancing the efficiency of government actions, CBA also
assists in overcoming cognitive problems that can lead people to misunderstand the
magnitude of the risks, thereby putting things in perspective and preventing government from
being indifferent to dangerous threats or from giving exaggerated attention to small problems
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that cause great public commotion. Thus, CBA can increase or decrease attention to safety
compared with the status quo112.
The benefits of governmental actions are often immaterial and must be translated into
monetary values to be considered in the cost-benefit analysis113. In CBA, economists try to
mimic the operation of the market in order to provide the monetary evaluation of the benefits
of life, health and nature itself114.
Through CBA, life, health and nature itself lose their ethical value and are subsumed
into a monetary amount during the weighting of governmental policies. Worse, as such
benefits are felt in the long term and time affects the value of financial resources, nature, life
and the health of future generations tend to weigh very little to present generations115. In this
context, prevention of fatalities that would occur in the long-term are just worthwhile when
their number is very large or the cost of precautions is very low116. Discounting future
benefits and foisting threats on future generations underestimates humanity’s care about their
progeny, which is a basic moral value of any human culture.
The cost-benefit approach treats individuals solely as consumers117, whose interests
and rights are determined by their capacity to pay. In this context, nature is just one of many
benefits that can be achieved for a certain price. Under this approach, it is impossible to get
away with the notion that the relationship between human and nature is marked by
domination. The maintenance of the cost-benefit approach towards the management of natural
mechanisms makes building harmony between humans and the land mechanism most
unlikely.
The CBA tends towards an expertise-dominated approach, which is akin to the
irrational weigher theory. Under this theory, individuals rely solely on their visceral and
affective reactions to recognize risks when they lack information or when they are presented
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with any other limit on their ability to engage in more considered assessments. The proposed
regulatory approach for this theory is based on shielding law from the “distorting” influence
of emotion and public irrationality by delegating regulatory power to politically insulated
experts who evaluate costs and benefits in a reasoned fashion118.
The expertise dominated approach is criticized for not respecting individuals’ factual
beliefs and for shielding regulatory law from citizens’ visions of the good society119, which is
an insult to citizens’ dignity120 and obviously against democratic values. Contrary to what the
expert dominated approach would suggest, emotion is not a substitute for information, but
rather a type of evaluative judgment by someone who has already had access to information
and time to reflect about it. According to the cultural evaluator theory, emotions enable the
individual to identify the opinion most appropriate to his or her individual commitments,
values, and ideals. The integration of emotions with risk perception equips decision makers to
discern issues of justice and ethical values, which cannot be assured by any set of
procedures121.
The cost-benefit analysis approach seems to tend towards less regulation. Empirical
studies have demonstrated that costs are often substantially overestimated in the cost-benefit
analysis elaborated prior to regulation, probably because cost estimates often originate from
the regulated industries themselves, who have great interest in defeating regulatory
initiatives122. Also, cost-benefit analysis usually does not anticipate innovation and gains in
efficiency stimulated by regulation. Therefore, the method tends to overestimate the costs and
to underestimate the benefits of any environmentally protective regulation. This may explain
the common perception that U.S. experts and policymakers – who adopt the cost-benefit
approach – favor less conservative environmental, health, and safety measures than their
European counterparts – who adopt the precautionary approach123.
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In the absence of a regulation forbidding or imposing greater burdens on
environmentally harmful activities, governments that seek to stimulate environmental
protection usually resort to the creation of economic incentives in order to encourage the
adoption of environmentally friendly solutions when there are cheaper alternatives in the
market. In this context, the adoption of a cost-benefit approach, the reduction of regulation
and the increasing deployment of market incentives are connected and mutually reinforcing.
In the United States, the tradition of adopting cost-benefit analysis to evaluate risks
and alternative mitigation measures dates back to 1981, during the Reagan Administration124.
President Nixon’s Executive Order 12,866125 provided that in deciding whether and how to
regulate, agencies should assess all the costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives,
including the alternative of not regulating; and choose the approach that maximizes the net
benefits.
It is possible to identify a recent tendency towards the pragmatic approach in the costbenefit American tradition after the enactment of President Obama’s Improving Regulation
and Regulatory Review Executive Order126. The pragmatic approach is a reorientation of the
cost-benefit approach which attempts to introduce the consideration of values that society
holds in high regard into the cost-benefit analysis.

Therefore, the pragmatic approach

recognizes the limits of technical expertise and the role of social values in decision-making
considerations. Such an approach is centered on statutory priorities and on justifying why
particular policies are preferable to others127. President Obama’s Executive Order reviews the
cost-benefit analysis in the American federal government by strongly emphasizing public
participation in the process and encouraging consideration of benefits that are difficult to
quantify such as “equity, human dignity, fairness, and distributive impacts”128.
The application of a cost-benefit approach in determining the appropriate response to
risks hampers the deployment of adaptive management techniques in governmental agencies
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because of the difficulty of assessing with a high degree of certainty the costs and benefits of
measures to mitigate the risk of a natural event. The risk of a natural event can hardly be
estimated from the historical record because of the variability of natural systems. In addition,
the harm caused by a natural event is partly a function of human siting decisions as well as
precaution and response systems, which may be difficult to assess129.
Besides the difficulty of assessing the risks of a natural event, and the benefits that
adaptive management would generate in preventing them, the CBA for an adaptive approach
is spoiled by a common misinterpretation of the costs of environmental regulation. One of the
costs governmental agencies include in CBA for environmental regulation is the amount of
benefits that society will lose by restricting or prohibiting an economic activity. The issue
observed in this context is that the benefits of environmentally harmful activities are usually
known before their costs to the environment and to society are fully assessed, because the
assessment of benefits is in the interest of the entrepreneur, who has the greater knowledge
about the activity being developed. Corroborating this is the fact that sometimes the downside
of an activity has a latency period, during which the negative effects cannot be assessed.
Many examples can be given of this phenomenon, such as the Polychlorinated Biphenyl
(PCB) substance largely used in industrial and commercial applications from 1929 to the
1970’s due to its non-flammability, chemical stability, high boiling point, and electrical
insulating properties130. Only after fifty years of usage was the substance banned in the United
States and other countries due to its devastating health effects131.
Because the benefits of a new activity or product tend to be assessed prior to its costs,
the cost-benefit analysis of regulatory agencies is most likely to conclude that the activity
presents high benefits and uncertain costs. Based on this finding, the agency is likely to decide
on regulatory inaction because the regulator will lack safety arguments for imposing a
regulatory burden on an activity that presents a mere hypothetical possibility of generating
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costs that outweigh its benefits to society. An example of this situation was observed in the
U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s review of nanoparticle-containing sunscreens, when the
agency treated situations of deep uncertainty regarding the potential impacts of novel
technological processes as unworthy of regulatory attention132.
In summary, the adoption of cost-benefit analysis as the sole approach to the decisionmaking process of weighing alternatives hampers the creation of protective environmental
regulation; the adoption of adaptive management by agencies; and the consideration of ethical
values in decision-making, such as the inherent value of nature, and the goals of living in
harmony with nature and caring about future generations.
On the other hand, cost-benefit analysis makes for government efficiency, which is an
important value of administration and cannot be forsaken. However, even solely examining
the contributions of cost-benefit analysis to governmental efficiency, it is fair to say that this
method is not sufficient to address governmental efficiency because it is too much centered on
efficiency in the short term. Its techniques for discounting the future, its limitations on
predicting the benefits of protective measures (which include both protective regulation and
adoption of adaptive management) and its overestimation of the costs of environmental
protection prevent it from being taken as a complete tool to address governmental efficiency
in the long term.
Ensuring efficiency in the long term for the management of natural resources is the
aim of green economy and a requirement of sustainable development and of the principle of
resilience. If cost-benefit analysis cannot provide efficiency in the long term, it obligatorily
must be coupled with other approaches to decision making that are compromised with it.
The need for combining cost-benefit analysis with other approaches to decision
making also appeals as a matter of justice. Cost-benefit analysis employs an economic method
for solving disputes between economic and environmental interests. Of course such a method
is more appropriate to quantify economic interests than any other sort of interest and clearly
the method itself will contribute to the achievement of decisions that tilt towards economic
interests.
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Due to this trend, the recognition of the principle of resilience as a legal principle and
the commitment of procedural rules with the achievement of justice requires cost-benefit
analysis to be just one of the phases of decision making, and not the entire process.
The application of the principle of resilience to the decision making process points
towards the introduction of a weighing phase, where the administrative organ has to weight
the experts’ opinion (represented by the result of the cost-benefit analysis) with input from
public participation and with environmental conservation values recognized in statute. In this
context, the recognition of environmental conservation values by the law is extremely
important because the courts’ power of review over agencies’ decisions is usually restricted to
reviewing the legality of the act – the court cannot decide on questions of merit, in respect to
the Separation of Powers. If the law does not require the agency to consider certain
conservation values in its decisions, the courts cannot oblige the agency to do so.
One may argue that weighing ethical values in decision making is not part of the
functioning of many governmental agencies nowadays and, for that reason, the fulfillment of
this requirement can endanger agencies organization and good functioning. For this reason,
education and training of government personnel on environmental conservation and its values
is very important. Education for conservation extended to the whole society is also important
to provide citizens with tools to exercise oversight of agencies’ actions through citizen suit
provisions or others means of public participation in decision making.
Also, it might be interesting to consider the establishment of a separate entity to opine
how a proposed project or policy might endanger the interests of next generations and nature
itself. This entity could be created based on the Hungarian ombudsman for next generations.
The Hungarian ombudsman can address constitutional complaints regarding violations of
Hungarians’ right to environmental protection and a healthy environment; promote research
on topics of interest; and do parliamentary advocacy, for example, by pointing out how legal
drafts can impact the interests of next generations133.

Precautionary principle
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The precautionary principle guides decision makers to take precautionary measures
when an activity can cause serious or irreversible harm to human health or the environment,
even if cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically134.
The advent of the precautionary principle is related to a common deficiency in the
application of the preventive principle. According to the preventive principle, when an
activity has been scientifically proven to cause harm, the proponent must take measures to
prevent, mitigate or compensate for the harm. However, the lack of reliable monitoring data
on the long-term cumulative and combined effects of harmful activities on complex
ecosystems often leads to uncertainty regarding the scientific assessments of environmental
impacts135. The lack of scientific certainty of cause and effect relationships was the motive for
the creation of the precautionary principle in order to guide decision-makers in the very
frequent occasions where they are required to decide how to address potential, uncertain or
even hypothetical threats, which can make the consequences of inaction serious or
irreversible136.
The precautionary principle acknowledges the complexity of ecosystems and the
limits of human understanding of natural mechanisms. That is the reason why the principle
adopts an ecosystem approach, rather than fragmenting environmental protection in singlespecies or single-natural-function approaches137. That is also the reason why the relationship
between the precautionary principle and science is marked by a culture of humility about the
sufficiency and accuracy of existing knowledge when dealing with environmental, health, and
safety regulation138.
Even though the precautionary principle acknowledges scientific uncertainty when
there is not sufficient evidence regarding ecosystem functioning, or on the probabilities of
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adverse outcomes, nonetheless, the principle attributes an important role to science. Science
recognizes and quantifies environmental problems, thereby reducing management
uncertainties; science provides key evidence to guide decision makers as to which risks are
graver and on which management actions should be prioritized; experts also provide decision
makers with alternatives for action and assess which alternative is safer under a scientific
point of view139.
Decision making attendant to the precautionary principle is not made solely based on
the information provided by science; the precautionary principle is applied on a case-by-case
basis, where scientists inform decision makers, who weigh up the scientific knowledge with
value judgments of a moral, cultural, economic and political nature140. If decision makers do
not chose the alternative that scientists have considered the safest one, decision makers must
justify their choice141. This rule allows decision makers to diverge from scientists while at the
same time providing the public with means to evaluate the legitimacy of decision makers’
choices.
Along with the scientific knowledge and during the weighing process, decision makers
are also advised by the FAO technical guidance on the precautionary approach142 to consider
traditional, indigenous and local resources users’ knowledge of how the ecosystem functions.
These groups have an intense and long-lasting relationship with the surrounding environment,
through which they construct an empirical knowledge that often covers longer periods of
observation than scientific studies do143. The importance attributed to non-scientific forms of
knowledge in the design of public policies is another consequence of the acknowledgement
that science is not absolute.
The precautionary principle recognizes the importance of the well-being of nonhuman entities, the intrinsic value of ecological systems and, therefore, the moral obligation
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of humankind to protect vulnerable or critical natural systems144. In this respect, the principle
is much aligned to the premises of the land ethic.
The precautionary principle is guided by the premise that society must not be
paralyzed by the lack of scientific knowledge and, therefore must take action to protect health
and the environment145 even when facing uncertainty. Thus, the precautionary principle
guides decision makers to respond to deficiencies of understanding by constantly reevaluating
and improving learning and knowledge146. Consequently, the precautionary principle requires
a high degree of information and monitoring147.
The recognition of limited knowledge and the emphasis on taking action and on
learning leads to the conclusion that error in environmental management is highly possible. In
order to protect the environment from such errors, the precautionary principle recognizes the
need for preparedness to provide ecological space for recovery from potential policy mistakes.
Preparedness against errors can be achieved by leaving a margin of error when establishing
harvest limits148.
The precautionary principle challenges the current legal, political, social and economic
system on many grounds. First, the principle deals with uncertainty, while traditional legal
systems rely on certainty and predictability. Second, the moral obligation to protect the
environment contradicts the modern western belief that human interests, such as material
growth, always have pre-eminence over non-human interests. Third, as above mentioned, the
principle requires leaving a margin of error when establishing harvest limits, which is against
the market logic to maximize the revenue by exploiting all available resources. Forth, the
principle requires long-term economic and social considerations, in order to prevent decision
makers from taking no notice of the abundant benefits of preventing irreversible damages that
would be felt in the medium and long-term future. Fifth, the principle challenges policy
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makers to promote an inter-disciplinary consideration of factors that influence decision
making when weighing the information available about an uncertain threat149.
The precautionary principle is abundantly present in soft and hard law agreements
(Rio Declaration, UNFCCC, CBD, Stockholm Convention on POPs, Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety, European Community – Treaty of Rome) and in state practice and judicial opinion.
However, it has not been fully applied in rulings of international courts150.
When there are concerns regarding unknown but potentially devastating threats to
natural systems that are thought to be of fundamental and irreplaceable importance to
humanity, the precautionary principle guides decision makers to assess what would be the
worst possible outcome and to align their decisions to prevent the occurrence of such event.
That guidance is called the maximin principle. However, the applicability of the maximin
principle is limited and it is not recommended for times when the costs of precaution become
immoderate or unacceptably large. When an activity can pose serious threats to the
environment, but the costs of prohibiting it are too burdensome, the precautionary principle
advises governments and private actors to “do the best they can” to mitigate the negative
impacts of such activity151. This commitment is implied in United States pollution control
statutes which require the installation of the best available pollution abatement technology152.
The precautionary principle entails a shift in the burden of proof onto proponents and
developers. This measure aims to prevent the environment or human populations from bearing
the burden of uncertainty. The shift in the burden of proof corrects a defect of traditional legal
systems that disallow claims for compensation for accidents and acts of God, which
disincentive developers from taking adequate precaution measures153.
The precautionary principle provides a few guidelines for decision makers to consider
during the weighing process. First, decision making should be transparent and it should allow
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public participation154. Second, decision makers must consider the proportionality of
protective measures in relation to the level of security to be achieved155.
Adaptive management is also often referred to as a means to implement the
precautionary principle156 in risk management, although some authors understand that
adaptive management and the precautionary principle are incompatible157. Adaptive
management is a useful tool for the precautionary principle because it stands for taking action
for conservation even when there is no complete understanding as to which would be the most
appropriate protective measure. Adaptive management, such as the precautionary principle,
recognizes the value of learning from experience and of monitoring policy effects, keeping
risk regulation to a perceived threat updated over time158. Also, other tools of the
precautionary principle, such as the shift of the burden of proof, can provide a valuable aid to
the adaptive management learning process by incentivizing research and understanding by
developers and activity proponents on imperfectly characterized threats159.
Besides the affinity with adaptive management, the precautionary principle shares
other premises and values held by the principle of resilience. Therefore, the precautionary
principle can make a great contribution to the implementation of the principle of resilience,
especially regarding the reconciliation of adaptive management, public participation, legal
predictability and legitimacy, and the ethical and ecological values of the principle of
resilience.
The precautionary principle reinforces the notion that political communities retain
special responsibility to evaluate the effects of their decisions not only on themselves, but also
on those is not involved in the decision process, such as other societies, future human
generations and nature itself160. Thereby, besides being an opportunity to maximize welfare
functions, the policy making process becomes a forum for discussions regarding the
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obligation of the regulating body towards these non-represented groups161. Acknowledgement
of such a responsibility attributes a collective moral identity to social choices162. By this
means, the precautionary principle establishes the correlation between policy choices and
ethics.
Like the principle of resilience, the precautionary principle acknowledges that
humankind’s obligation to protect the environment has a moral justification. However, the
principle of resilience goes further, acknowledging that society must not only protect the
environment, but also adopt ways of life that are in synergy with ecosystem functions,
especially regarding patterns of production and consumption.
Besides recognizing these societal moral duties, the principle of resilience also
recognizes the individual moral duty to respect nature and to pursue a way of living in
harmony with the land mechanism. The precautionary principle promotes the saying “do the
best you can” regarding activities that cause environmental impacts but that are, nonetheless,
necessary and irreplaceable for society. In the same way, the principle of resilience
acknowledges that humans have a moral responsibility to do their best to aid the land
mechanism to maintain its mutually enforcing processes as a recompense for the benefits the
environment provides us and for the unavoidable burdens we inflict on the land mechanism.
Also common to both principles is the idea that humans must take action to comply
with the moral obligation to protect the environment, even when the scientific knowledge on
impacts and their solutions is not yet complete. Therefore, unlike cost-benefit analysis, both
the principle of resilience and the precautionary principle point towards regulatory action in
the face of uncertainty.
Adaptive management decisions should demonstrate the adoption of the policy
alternative that presented the greater synergy with ecosystem functions. If such an alternative
is not adopted, policy makers must justify the reason priority was given to the other value.
The lack of justification or the lack of sufficient evidence to support the decision may
motivate judicial review of the agency’s decision.

161
162

Id., at 47.
Id., at 12.
©2011 Lia Helena Demange

54

Some interpretations of the precautionary principle attribute particular importance to
the preservation of fundamental ecosystems functions, such as the proposal to employ “safe
minimum standards” to Earth’s life-support systems facing potentially devastating threats, in
order to protect them whatever the cost163. This application of the precautionary principle can
enforce the ecological goal of the principle of resilience to preserve ecosystem functions and
prevent irreversible changes in stability domains.
Because the information available prior to decision making is not complete or
conclusive, the precautionary principle places great responsibility and discretion on decision
makers to do the weighing process. In order to prevent the process from becoming opaque,
thereby losing legitimacy, the precautionary principle requires enhanced means of public
participation and accountability of the decision makers within a public administration164.
Besides the lack of conclusiveness of any scientific evidence, some authors mention
other aspects of management in the face of uncertainty that can impoverish legitimacy.
Barbara Cosens observes that adaptive management requires the expansion of agencies’
discretion to decide and to change strategies based on the assessment of results. In addition,
this approach ascribes to scientists a key role in interpreting the data and in recommending
solutions. Because in a democracy legitimacy is achieved by the government of
representatives elected by citizens, the concentration of power on non-elected representatives
is seen as a reduction of decision-making legitimacy165.
Nevertheless, agencies already had substantial responsibility for decision making
before the implementation of the precautionary principle and the advent of adaptive
management. Since recognition of the need to prevent environmental impacts and the
adoption of the preventive principle, agencies were required to prove the potential impact of
an activity in order to justify environmental regulation166. Besides that, the enlargement of
agencies’ decision power is also due to their expertise in making decisions on complex issues
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and in solving issues about the interpretation of statutes faster and with a greater level of
detail than Congress167, which was a reality even before the precautionary principle arose.
Therefore, part of the impoverishment of legitimacy caused by the implementation of
the preventive principle is remedied by the precautionary principle, since the influence of
scientists in decision making is controlled by political decisions taken by the heads of
agencies during the weighing process. On the other hand, the impoverishment of decision
making legitimacy due to the transfer of decisions from the legislature to agencies can be
addressed by ensuring that there is enough publicity and public participation in the decisionmaking process. In addition, such problems can be addressed by greater Congressional and
Judicial oversight of agencies and by the employment of mechanisms proposed by Economic
Law literature to prevent agency capture.
Besides legitimacy, the law also makes claims for predictability, which is a very
challenging goal when dealing with uncertainty and adaptive management. Theorists on
adaptive management usually reject the use of regulation in the face of uncertainty168 and
management approaches that seek to replace the uncertainty of resource issues with the
certainty of a process169.
It is true that surprises are inevitable and that institutions managing for resilience must
be flexible. It is also true that the uncertainty of a management problem cannot be replaced by
a procedure. However, it does not mean that flexible institutions cannot observe any
procedure. As pointed out by Cosens, procedural rules provide legitimacy to acts of public
administration governed by the Administrative Law170. Therefore, public administration
cannot simply get rid of procedure. By the same token, agencies can act only within the limits
of power delegated by Congress. The limitation of agencies power and agencies’ obligation to
follow the rules determined by Congress and by the agency itself ensure to Congress and to
society that the agency will not exceed those limits and, if it does, that it will be reprimanded
for that. It is not possible to have Congressional, Judicial or citizen control over agencies if it
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is not perfectly clear which rules and procedures they must submit to. Without this control of
one governmental branch over the other, it is not possible to maintain a republican state. A
proposal of institutional design cannot ignore such basic legal premises and rules of power
distribution in national states; otherwise it risks never being adopted and implemented at all.
The delegation of power to agencies and the establishment of a procedure for adaptive
management can be formulated in a manner to attend to both the legal need for predictability
and procedural legitimacy, and the need to establish a method to guide the long-term process
of adaptive management. Aiming to attend to those two interests, this article proposes a
general roadmap for regulation for adaptive management.
The norm enacted by Congress which delegates power to an agency can provide
guidelines for the structure of policies and norms that should be created by the agency. For
example, the norm can establish that every policy created must define: goals; actions; predicted
results; time frame to launch actions in short, medium and long term; methods of monitoring;
the entity competent to do monitoring; deadlines for collection of monitoring data and for
release of monitoring results; and penalties for not complying with deadlines and guidelines
determined by the delegation statute.
Through the design of an adaptive management model coupled with basic regulation,
agencies have a certain freedom to determine the content of policies, while the regulation
structures a method. The establishment of a method is essential because it attends demands of
legal, political and scientific levels. From a legal perspective, the pre-determination of a
procedure attributes greater legitimacy to the process, ensures legal predictability, and
facilitates oversight by the legislature, by the Judiciary and by the public.
From a political perspective, the establishment of a procedure ensures the continuity of
the process even if the agency personnel change along with changes in government. It is
widely known that changes in government are a major cause for discontinuity of policy
measures and plans. The determination of a procedure can aid in the solution for this aspect
by forcing the agency to create long-term planning and goals, which will ensure the continuity
of management measures and which will have to be considered by the next generation of
decision-makers.
From a scientific perspective, the establishment of a procedure or method is natural to
the beginning of any research project or of any policy analysis. Therefore, such a measure is
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useful because it conciliates the need for legitimacy and predictability with the scientist’s
interest in flexibility in determining the content of the policy.
Ecologists usually consider that regulation is not best suited to guide the management
of ecosystems with regard to unknown threats because this kind of management does not
provide the flexibility required for dealing with the unexpected171. For such cases ecologists
suggest the use of adaptive management tools.
Although this work recognizes the value of adaptive management as a way of
rendering environmental regulation more flexible, it supports the view that the implementation
of an adaptive management process not supported by environmental regulation is
inconceivable. The reason for this is quite simple: the management of ecosystems necessarily
requires the imposition of restraints on actions perpetrated by private actors, because every
ecosystem supports anthropic activities which will be affected by a regulation aimed at
enhancing ecosystem resilience. As the actions of private actors can only be constrained by
rules of law, an adaptive management not supported by regulation would have very limited
implementation and efficacy.
The authors who advocate adaptive management usually prefer market incentives to
command-and-control regulations, as if they were independent of each other. However, in
order to be successful, any market incentives depend on the scarcity of whatever is tradable.
As the market does not naturally attribute value to an ecosystem’s functions or services,
market incentives always depend on a command-and-control regulation aimed at internalizing
environmental costs and attributing scarcity and value to the ecosystem’s services. Therefore,
adaptive management will always require some basic regulation.

Adaptive Management
The change in stability domain can motivate several human reactions: humans can do
nothing and wait to see if the system will return to some acceptable state; or they can actively
manage the system and try to return it to a desirable stability domain; or they can admit that

171

Allen et al., supra note 168, at 305.
©2011 Lia Helena Demange

58

the system is irreversibly changed and, hence, that the only strategy is to adapt to the new
altered system172. The first reaction – to do nothing – is hardly an option because human
activities and human lives depend on the ecosystem and the choice for inaction can represent
not only economic losses, but also the loss of lives. Therefore, humans need to manage
ecosystems sometimes for a return to a past condition, sometimes to adapt to an unavoidable
new condition. Due to the complexity of ecosystems, humans often lack complete
understanding about the processes that lead towards changes in stability domain. That is why
resource managers usually have to deal with uncertainty.
Literature recognizes adaptive management as the most suitable approach for dealing
with ecosystem complexity and the uncertainty generated by unknown threats173. This
management method is centered on feeding ecological knowledge into management
organizations by constantly improving understanding of ecosystem dynamics through the
interpretation of data periodically collected by observation and monitoring174.
Adaptive management is a result-based approach to management by agencies; its final
goal is to continuously enhance environmental quality. The adaptive management process
mainly consists in specifying objectives when addressing a management problem, articulating
a policy and evaluating the performance of the policy175. Adaptive management has great
potential for dealing with ecosystem resilience because this method relies on the observation
and interpretation of essential processes and variables in ecosystem dynamics176, constantly
using this knowledge to reevaluate and modify the management strategy. During the
evaluation process, a critical understanding of the effects of the policy creates an experience
platform upon which informed policy designs and meaningful choices can be based in the
future177.
Adaptive management distinguishes itself from conventional management because it
focuses on managing essential ecological processes that sustain the delivery of harvestable
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resources and ecosystem services at multiple temporal and spatial scales178, while the
conventional approach focuses on the assessment of the maximum sustainable yield of an
individual species at a single scale179. The protection of groups of species that develop the
same function at different scales reinforces the resilience of that function and enables that
function to be maintained despite sudden variations within specific scales180.

Obstacles to the adoption of adaptive management

There are a few characteristics of risk perception that may influence political
mobilization towards the adoption of adaptive management measures. It has been noticed that
involuntary exposure to risk is regarded by the public as less tolerable than voluntary
exposure. This might be explained by the fact that voluntary exposure presupposes that people
have both the knowledge about the risk and the freedom to choose to undertake the risk, thus
acknowledging people’s autonomy, equality and individual power – ideals most valued by
modern society. In the same sense, involuntary exposure to risk is seen as a signal of
uncontrollability and uncertainty181, which is usually condemned by modern society.
Probably for this reason, resource managers try to reduce the public perception of
uncertainty towards risks of natural disasters. They do so by ignoring most uncertainty; by
breaking the problem into trivial questions, thereby achieving a spurious certitude; or by
replacing the uncertainty of resource issues with the certainty of a process182.
Differently from the above mentioned reactions, adaptive management recognizes the
uncertainties of risks and confronts them183, which may give the public the false impression
that under adaptive management there is greater uncertainty than under other sorts of
management methods. In this context, the environmental principle of information plays an
important role in order to inform the public about the uncertainties inherent in any
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management method, thereby dissipating the false impression. It is expected that the potential
reluctance of public opinion to accept this method can be defeated by showing that adaptive
management is more suitable for dealing with uncertainty precisely because it does not hide
uncertainty.
The perception of risk also poses obstacles to adaptive management because natural
disasters get less attention than human-made events184; therefore there is less public pressure
towards the prevention of natural disasters than towards the prevention of terrorists’ attacks,
for example. When dealing with disasters, people are concerned not only with safety, but also
with responsibility and guilt, and as natural disasters are not considered to be caused by
humans, they are thought of as nobody’s responsibility185. Adaptive management hardly will
be able to change this perception, unless the increase in collection of information enables
managers to identify which specific human-made actions caused certain environmental
hazards.
Experience shows that the presence of certain circumstances can block the
development of adaptive environmental assessment and management or can make it not
recommendable. It occurs when an ecological system completely lacks resilience; institutions
lack flexibility; designing experiments presents technical challenges; natural resources present
certain characteristics that make experimentation impossible; or design analysis concludes
that the risks of failure are socially and legally unacceptable186. These circumstances affect a
manager’s capacity to experiment and learn from experience, which is a decisive feature of
adaptive

management187.

Also,

because

adaptive

management

needs

room

for

experimentation, it goes against market logic because it proposes the maintenance of a
minimum level of untouched and/or economically unused resources in order to preserve the
ecosystem’s ability to reorganize itself.
There is still reluctance among environmental agencies to implement adaptive
management. It is a method too complex, time consuming and often expensive – factors very

184

FABER ET AL, supra note 111, at 254.
Id., at 252-53 (quoting Clayton P. Gilette & James E. Krier, Risk, Court and Agencies, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1027 (1990)).
186
Gunderson supra note 169, at 6.
187
Folke et al., supra note 9, 447.
185

©2011 Lia Helena Demange

61

common to processes that involve scientific investigation and democratic debates with
insights from public participation.
As administrators pursue short term efficiency in their management methods, they
usually employ first the simplest management alternatives and leave adaptive management to
be used as the tool of last resort, when none of the others were effective188. The downside of
this reality is that adaptive management is employed when ecosystems are already very
distressed – at such a time, adaptive management cannot provide substantial aid because it is
not appropriate for ecosystems that have no resilience left.
The latency and irreversibility of some risks deny managers the fruits of trial-anderror, because, under these circumstances, the effects of an action are only identified years or
decades after implementation, when actions cannot be corrected anymore189. It is expected
that by enhancing the resilience of the ecosystem, managers will reduce the probability of
irreversible effects because the ecosystem will have wider capability to adapt to different
circumstances. However, if the ecosystem totally lacks resilience, managers will not be able
to rely on adaptive management for dealing with risks with potential latency and
irreversibility because adaptive management entails experimentation.
Certain legal measures can be taken to attenuate or remove the obstacles to the
implementation of adaptive management. These measures are explained below.

EIA and related tools

The EIA related tools can contribute to the transfer of information required by the
implementation of adaptive management by predicting the potential impacts of policies; by
assessing the alternatives; and by ensuring public access to information and participation in
the decision process.
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Tools such as strategic environmental assessment or area wide assessments are of even
greater importance in enhancing adaptive management considering that most of the surprises,
classified as local and cross-scale190, could be predicted and monitored through the integration
of information of local and regional scale.
EIA can also help in implementing adaptive management at the project level by
requiring, during the process of renewal of the license, the reevaluation of an activity’s
impacts and of its mitigation measures. Therefore, instead of renewing environmental licenses
without further questioning, agencies could evaluate whether the mitigation measures that
condition the license were efficient and whether new mitigation measures are needed.
Aiming to prevent the repeated incidence of such situations, several measures tending
to simplify the adaptive management process can be employed. First, environmental
departments should unify the methodologies employed in the collection of ecosystem data
within the several EIA related tools – such as the EIAs itself, the SEAs, and the EMSs –
because lack of standardization is often a reason why available data cannot be used in
modeling and why it has to be recollected by adaptive managers191. By this means, the
environmental department will focus on managing and analyzing the available data rather
than on collecting it. Second, the models developed by managers to aid in the understanding
of the functioning of the ecosystem have to be kept as simple as possible and the predictions
of the need for new data should be constantly reviewed in order to prevent the collection of
irrelevant data192.

Risk evaluation, disaster preparedness and recovery
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Disasters are the impacts that hazardous events have on people and property. Such
impacts are determined not only by the magnitude of the event, but also by human interaction
with nature and by our choices about where and how we live193. No disaster is completely
natural because the degree of impact that a natural event causes to humans is highly
determined by human exposure and vulnerability to risk, which is a product of cultural
patterns influenced heavily by law194. Therefore, law has an important role to play in
preventing emergencies, especially through the elaboration of emergency plans and land use
regulation. The success of disaster law is judged by its results in minimizing disaster costs as
a whole, as well as minimizing disparate impacts on vulnerable communities195.
In summary, disaster law is the legal area dedicated to eliminating or reducing the
disturbance caused by known and unknown threats. As for unknown threats, there is an area
of overlapping between adaptive management and disaster law that justifies the application of
the principle of resilience in this legal field.
There is a clear interconnection between vulnerable ecosystems and natural disasters.
The increasing vulnerability of ecosystems noticed in the last decades has been followed by
records that cause concern regarding the intensification of impacts caused by natural
hazards196.
Therefore, enhancing ecosystem resilience is an efficient way to achieve greater levels
of safety regarding natural disasters. This fact has already been recognized by the best
literature on disaster management. Faber et al acknowledges that land use planning that
exacerbates disaster risk; failure to maintain green infrastructure; and climate change are
among the main causes for the recent increase in disaster occurrence197. The United Nations
Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2009 listed among the strategies for
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protecting green infrastructure the need to build ecosystem resilience and to promote
integrated planning, in which both environmental and disaster risk considerations are factored
into land use and development planning198. The 2011 version of the UNISDR Report
mentioned that investing in green cities may be a more cost-effective means of reducing urban
flooding than expensive investments that increase storm drainage capacity199.
By the same token, disaster management would be enhanced by the insertion of
concerns with ecosystem resilience, in the same way that environmental protection would be
much enhanced by the introduction of ecosystem resilience into disaster law. That is so
because often measures taken for emergency response are potentially harmful to the
environment and could be replaced by more environmentally friendly alternatives, if decision
makers were considering the environmental effects of their actions.
The relationship among flood occurrence, land use patterns and the construction of
levees is an example of this kind of situation where disaster management can choose between
a sustainable or an unsustainable solution. Both land use regulation and levees are means to
control flood risk: the former prevents the formation of ecologically sensitive areas200; the
latter exacerbates the risk of flooding downstream in catastrophic events when the levees are
overtopped201. Consequently, the avoidance of floods by land use regulation represents a
disaster mitigation measure that is both environmentally friendly and more efficient in
preventing natural disasters.
Disaster planners should be aware that concerns about ecosystem resilience and
ecosystem services prevent the occurrence of disasters altogether, thus generating benefits not
solely to the environment, but also to property safety and, more importantly, to human lives.
However, the assessment of the United Nations Global Assessment Report on Disaster
Risk Reduction 2011 shows that national policy worldwide202 has been tending otherwise:
less progress was made integrating disaster risk management into environmental policies in
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2009-2011 than in 2007–2009203.

This is the result of overlapping responsibilities and

legislation which hamper governmental efficiency in addressing environmental and disasterrelated problems.
The application of the principle of resilience to disaster management expands the
reach of disaster law concerns: besides considering solely the impacts hazardous events cause
to human and property safety, disaster law is supposed to also consider the impacts such
events cause to ecosystems. The inclusion of environmental concerns in disaster preparedness
goals was already acknowledged by 168 States in 2005, when the Hyogo Framework for
Action was adopted. This Framework aims to achieve a substantial reduction of disaster
losses, in lives and in the social, economic and environmental assets of countries and
communities by 2015.
Governmental and legal responses to disasters rely on the circle of risk management,
which is composed of mitigation, emergency response, compensation, and rebuilding204.
Mitigation involves prevention and protection against the impacts of major events on lives
and property, which might include preventive measures such as investigations regarding the
full nature and source of the threat, or disruption of illegal activity, and protective measures
aimed at reducing the vulnerability of critical infrastructure or key resources in order to deter,
mitigate or neutralize major disasters. Protection also includes elevated awareness,
identification and promotion of effective sector-specific protection practices. Emergency
response involves the activities that address the short-term, direct effects of an incident.
Compensation and rebuilding are elements of the emergency recovery phase, which also
involves long-term care and treatment of affected persons and the development, coordination,
and execution of site and services restoration plans205.
The application of the principle of resilience to disaster law will be facilitated if
adaptive management concerns and procedure are included in the circle of risk management.
Once the vulnerability of ecosystems to disturbances is itself a risk to human health and
human activities, the assessment of ecosystem resilience should be employed in the mitigation
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process, as a means of investigating the full nature and source of an unknown natural threat.
Information on the functioning of ecosystems, collected by environmental impact assessments
and consequent monitoring, can be employed for this purpose, and also for structuring an
adequate and up-to-date emergency preparedness plan. Data produced through the observation
of ecosystem reactions to environmental policies can be used during the emergency response
phase, in order to avoid allowing decision makers to opt for policy solutions that might
weaken ecosystem resilience during rebuilding and recovery.
The circle of risk management can be put to work for the benefit of the principle of
resilience even when adaptive management is not yet adopted by environmental agencies.
This is so because the occurrence of a hazardous event can highlight to the public errors in
management that have resulted in greater vulnerability to catastrophes. When a failure in
management is noticed, decision makers are more likely to emphasize learning and to support
a change in polices and methods than when the policy applied seems to be working
perfectly206. Under those circumstances, the adaptive management procedure has higher
chances of being accepted and adopted if it is proposed during the recovery phase of the circle
of risk management because there will be greater political will to implement innovative
solutions.
The perception of risk influences the political will to adopt adaptive management.
However, that is not the sole factor that influences decision making regarding risks.
Governments are also subjected to procedures and directives guiding which measures and
regulations can and cannot be taken to address certain risks. The influence of governmental
governance on the adoption of adaptive management will be analyzed in the following
section, dedicated to adaptive governance.

Environmental Impact Assessment
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Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is a procedure for “evaluating the likely
impact of a proposed activity on the environment”207 prior to the commencement of a project.
This procedure is aimed at providing the necessary knowledge to decision-makers to prevent
environmental harm before it occurs208. Although the EIA aids informed decision making by
identifying the environmental risks of an activity, it does not determine whether a project
should proceed and how it should be regulated; such decisions are assigned to public
authorities, who will balance the information provided by the EIA with other national or
regional concerns209. The duty to promote an EIA is essentially procedural because public
authorities’ decision is not bound by the findings of the EIA210.
The EIA contributes to the implementation of national policies on sustainable
development and precautionary action. The EIA procedure provides information on
environmental risks to the public and offers the opportunity for public participation in
decision-making regarding environmental issues211.
Both in the international and in the national sphere, the EIA provides governments
with the information needed to evaluate whether the benefits of an activity exceed the
activity’s negative consequences to the environment. Depending on the result of this
balancing process, the activity may be enjoined, restricted, or otherwise regulated in order to
oblige the proponent to: change the initial project, mitigate the expected impacts or pay for
the environmental costs his activity will cause society.
The strongest and most comprehensive elaboration of the states’ duty to promote
environmental impact assessment is stated in Rio Declaration Principle 17:
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Environmental impact assessment, as a national instrument, shall be undertaken for proposed activities
that are likely to have a significant adverse impact on the environment and are subject to a decision of a
competent national authority.

However, this was not the only international document that required the elaboration of
EIA: it is required under other non-binding instruments212. The EIA is also required under
several binding international conventions213. The EIA is required by multilateral financial
institutions214 and the government’s duty to elaborate the EIA has been referenced in
international judicial decisions215. The EIA procedure is also considered an obligation
imposed by the “do no-harm” or “good neighborliness” general principle of International Law
to the State that is proposing an activity that can cause transboundary environmental harm216.
The duty to promote environmental impact assessment is so well established in
international environmental law that it can be regarded as a general principle of law or even a
requirement of customary law217.
The great majority of countries in the world have adopted the EIA as mandatory
regulations or, at least, informal guidelines218. The elaboration of EIAs is usually a
prerequisite governments require from project proponents before granting them permits
necessary for the initiation of project.
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EIA Procedure beneficial characteristics

Although the principle of resilience is essentially substantive, this article proposes that
the principle has a procedural facet, in order to facilitate implementation. The application of
the principle of resilience to the EIA procedure can comply with this need.
As EIA obliges the consideration of environmental issues prior to every project that
can cause significant environmental harm, it is an important tool to include concerns
regarding ecosystem resilience in activities that incidentally affect and are affected by the
environment, but that are not directly focused on environmental management.
The introduction of the principle of resilience in EIA procedure recognizes the State’s
duty to identify the factors that put ecosystem resilience at risk and to address such factors in
a way that creates greater resilience. In this duty is implicit the idea, also present in many
international agreements, that States should seek to enhance environmental quality (not only
to mitigate impacts). Also, a natural and procedural consequence of such a duty is that
government officials should receive training in identifying human activities and natural
phenomena that may impact ecosystem resilience.
Since everybody has the right to use natural resources in a way that does not impair
the perpetuation of ecosystem features, the EIA has an important role in predicting and
preventing such impairment. Also, once a proposed activity could harm the environment
solely by increasing the vulnerability of the ecosystem to disturbances, it is a logical
conclusion that the assessment of ecosystem vulnerability and, therefore, ecosystem resilience
should be included in every EIA. Thus, the inclusion of concerns about improving ecosystem
resilience in EIA procedures would contribute to the completeness of the environmental
impact assessment and enhance its capacity to predict and prevent all possible impacts.
If the EIA identifies an activity that can impair the continuing exercise of an
ecosystem function and the government authorizes this activity, the implementation of the
activity can result not only in the collapse of the ecosystem as a whole, but also in the collapse
of the economic activity itself, which depends on the regular functioning of the ecosystem to
keep going. Therefore, the introduction of the evaluation of ecosystem resilience in
environmental impact assessments is important not only to increase EIA’s capacity to prevent
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environmental harm but also to increment EIA’s value to society, by alerting officials and
preventing ecological consequences that can result in loss of investments. In order to illustrate
the kind of losses entrepreneurs can suffer due to ecological consequences of ill-planned
human activity, it is possible to mention the case of the blueberry growers, Bridges Brothers
Ltd., who claimed that spraying fenitrothion to control outbreaks of spruce budworm in the
Canadian forest caused the death of pollinating bees and, consequently, damaged the
blueberry crop. The loss of the crop over the period of 1970-1971 resulted in an assessed loss
of $1,331,693.14219.
The EIA can also stimulate the alteration of the project design in order to increase the
adoption of patterns of production in synergy with ecosystem function. This goal can be
achieved by using raw materials naturally provided by the ecosystem where the facility is
located instead of introducing crops of alien species or importing raw materials from other
places (disposal of which will introduce alien substances into the ecosystem, potentially
causing disequilibrium in ecosystem function).
The fact that every EIA requires a background study of the ecosystem where the
proposed activity will be located and the study of the impacts the activity can cause on species
and on ecosystem functions provides environmental agencies a great quantity of information
on the environmental status of a region and on the activities developed there. This information
is necessary to assess the resilience of an ecosystem and would be too costly to be produced
by the government alone. Also, the fact that the generation of such information is mandatory
is an advantage because it makes this a secure source of information to agencies as it is not
subject to the lack of funding or other issues that can retard or disable the collection of data by
public or private research programs.
The EIA also provides an opportunity for interdisciplinary discussion regarding a
project during its elaboration and when decision-makers balance the environmental concerns
presented in the EIA final report with other interests to decide whether a project should be
implemented.

EIA Procedure limitations and how to address them
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Foreseeability of the harm

The obligation to do an environmental impact assessment is limited in scope in two
ways. First, a threshold of foreseeability of harm must be met before the obligation arises.
Under most treaties, the obligation to do one EIA and to notify states endangered by the
activity arises only once it is previously known that the harm is likely to occur220. This EIA
limitation is negative for the implementation of the principle of resilience because most
harmful consequences of weakened resilience are unpredictable and are noticed only after
they have already occurred.
The need for a threshold of foreseeability of an activity’s impacts on ecosystem
resilience is particularly difficult to achieve due to the existing uncertainty regarding how
ecosystem functions are distributed among the different species and which kind of disturbance
would cause the ecosystem to collapse.
There are some possible solutions to this limitation of the scope of EIA obligation
regarding the need for a threshold of foreseeability. One is to rely on the precautionary
principle when interpreting references to the likelihood of harm in Principle 17 of the Rio
Declaration, in order to lower the threshold of risk required for the EIA obligation to arise.
One application of such an approach, adopted by the Antarctic Protocol, is to require for all
activities, except in de minimis cases, an “initial environmental examination” to determine
whether the expected impact is more than minor221.
Another solution is to distribute the requirement to assess environmental impacts
between the prior impact assessment, which we regularly understand by EIA, and the post
impact assessment, which is referred to as post impact monitoring or just monitoring. The
prior impact assessment would be responsible for revealing predictable impacts and imposing
measures to mitigate them, while the post impact assessment would identify and address
unpredictable impacts and inefficiencies of the mitigation measures proposed by the prior
assessment.
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This approach, which is classified as adaptive, recognizes that prior assessment is not
capable of predicting the totality of impacts and providing certainty222. Monitoring shifts the
EIA procedure’s priority from prediction and control to adaptability and responsiveness.
Approaches to operating in chaotic and complex environments that evolve and change in
parallel with the ecosystem are more likely to be effective in coping with uncertainty223. By
managing ecosystems for uncertainty, the adaptive approach transforms the EIA procedure
into an ongoing investigation rather than a one-time prediction of impacts224.
Monitoring provides the opportunity to determine the causes of change and whether
such change is a consequence of the project or of another type of action225. This procedure
also assesses a project’s compliance with regulations, agreements or legislation and provides
agencies with proper information to assess the effects of the project’s mitigation policy in
order to determine if further action should be taken to prevent environmental harm226. The
assessment of compliance with legislation coupled with the gathering of information about the
progress of a particular project increase the transparency and accountability of proponents’
mitigation actions, as the procedure assesses whether mitigation actions are actually reducing
impacts.
Monitoring enables managers to identify potential negative trends at an early stage and
to better understand the complex relationships between human actions, and environmental and
social systems227. This understanding enables the construction of scientific knowledge about
how to enhance the ecosystem’s capability to recover rapidly from disturbances.
The greater transparency and oversight of the results of mitigation actions made
possible by monitoring increases the likelihood of proportioning environmental improvements
through human activities. Therefore, monitoring provides a tool for expanding the meaning of
management beyond the mere mitigation of impacts towards the continuous improvement of
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environmental quality. The adoption of this broader perspective on management strategies is
needed if sustainable development is truly a goal of EIA procedure228.
Therefore, the procedural background of the principle of resilience is enhanced by the
recognition of the legal obligation to monitor environmental conditions and to employ the
monitoring procedure to guide actions aimed at creating positive environmental effects by
human activities.
In order to provide the tools for environmental improvement, one important part of the
post-impact analysis is auditing the information obtained through monitoring. While
monitoring is the observation, measurement and recording of information about specific
aspects of the project229, auditing is a later stage of the process when accounts and records are
examined and verified in order to show trends and compare the results to the targets, thereby
assessing how close the actual situation comes to meeting the situation initially predicted230.
Auditing is effectively an evaluation of the EIA process: investigating whether or not predicted impacts
have actually occurred; whether methods used to make these predictions were reliable, whether
recommendations were followed; and whether safeguards were effective231.

In order to provide an impartial assessment of the environmental quality achieved by a
project or by a policy, auditing is supposed to be done by a party not involved in the project or
policy232.
In the international sphere, the regulation of monitoring is very limited. It is regulated
under the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context
(Espoo Convention), which was signed mostly by European countries233. At Article 7, the
Convention recognizes the close relationship between prior EIA and subsequent monitoring
but does not mandate the elaboration of monitoring for every likely significant transboundary
impact. The concerned Parties are supposed to decide, upon request, if a post-project analysis
will be carried out and under which conditions.
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The monitoring of the implementation effects of plans and programs is required under
Article 12 of the Kiev Protocol and article 10 of the European Commission 2001 Directive in
order ‘to identify at an early stage unforeseen adverse effects, and to be able to undertake
appropriate remedial action’.
In summary, European regional law requires monitoring of plans and programs likely
to cause significant adverse transboundary impact, but it does not require monitoring at the
project level, except when the concerned countries decide so234. At the international level, the
obligation to promote monitoring is non-existent.
At the national level, statutes requiring the elaboration of a monitoring plan within the
environmental assessment procedure are present in Canada and Brazil.
In Brazil, every EIA is required to present a monitoring plan235. However, the
execution of this plan is much prejudiced because the federal regulation does not provide
deadlines and penalties for project proponents who do not provide periodic monitoring
reports. Besides that, the elaboration of monitoring reports is not a prerequisite for the
renewal of an environmental license. In addition to the execution of the monitoring plan, the
environmental agencies can require private entities to provide any kind of information
regarding the potential or actual environmental impacts of their activities236. Therefore, the
enforcement of the monitoring plan is left to the discretion of environmental agencies. As in
most countries, Brazilian environmental agencies deal with the constant problem of excessive
work load exercised by reduced personnel, which contributes to the lack of enforcement of
monitoring provisions.
Additionally, monitoring in Brazil is also exercised by the government during frequent
inspections of industrial and commercial facilities by environmental agents to identify
environmental impacts not covered or predicted by the project’s environmental license237.
Therefore, the monitoring is usually limited to the assessment of compliance with permits and

234

As for Canada, the only non-European country to ratify the Espoo Convention, it is bound by the Convention,
but not by the Protocol, which it did not sign. Therefore, it is not required to monitor plans and programs likely
to cause significant transboundary impact.
235
Resolução CONAMA [Res. CONAMA] n. 001/1986, art. 6, IV (Braz.).
236
Lei n. 10650/2003, art. 3 (Braz.).
237
MINISTÉRIO DO MEIO AMBIENTE [MMA], PROGRAMA NACIONAL DE CAPACITAÇÃO DE GESTORES
AMBIENTAIS: LICENCIAMENTO AMBIENTAL 67, (2009) (Braz.).
©2011 Lia Helena Demange

75

legislation. If environmental agencies learn of supervening grave risks to the environment or
to human health238 caused by the project, they are able to modify or cancel the environmental
license.
The Canadian Environmental Assessment Act assigns to the environmental agencies
the obligation to design and ensure the implementation of a follow-up program when a project
is required to promote mitigation measures239. When a project is not likely to cause significant
impact, the agency has discretion to decide whether a follow-up program is appropriate240.
Follow-up requirements rarely are determined until after project approval is granted with the
result that little attention is paid to specific arrangements for follow-up in the assessment or
the EIS241.
In the United States, there is no obligation to monitor impacts at the federal level
within the EIA procedure. Monitoring is utilized to assess compliance with permits and
legislation, especially regarding the presence of contaminants in water and air242. Monitoring
elaborated under an ecosystem approach is applied to National Parks243 and to projects of
restoration of wetlands244. The policy of wetlands mitigation banking allows developers to
compensate for wetlands that will be destroyed through development by ensuring the
restoration of wetlands in another location245. The monitoring is used to verify whether the
restoration actually occurred in order to permit the compensation.
EIA effectiveness reviews demonstrate that monitoring is more the exception than the
rule. The same can be said about accurate forecasts and the use of confidence limits (as a
means of acknowledging uncertainties)246.

Significant impact on the environment
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The second limitation on EIA scope refers to the fact that the procedure is solely
applied to activities that will probably have a significant impact on the environment.
Therefore, the procedure is not required for activities whose impact is deemed small or
transitory247.
Ecosystem resilience can be threatened by activities that generate irrelevant impacts if
considered separately, but that are capable of weakening ecosystem resilience if considered
collectively. The process of loss of resilience is cumulative because the inability to replenish
coping resources propels a region and its people to increasing criticality248. If the
environmental evaluation scheme relies only on project-based environmental impact
assessment, the detection of impoverishment of resilience can be seriously affected. That is
why it is important to treat ecosystem resilience both as a direct and indirect impact on
activities.
The evaluation of indirect impacts is not exempt from the EIA procedure. Direct
impacts on the physical environment, as well as indirect impacts arising from other types of
induced activity, the interrelatedness of environmental impacts and cumulative impacts need
to be assessed249.
However, due to their nature, indirect impacts are better detected through the use of
differentiated methods able to link EIA to related projects and activities, such as legislative
proposals, policies, programs and plans. According to Lawrence, such a link can be
established through the elaboration of SEAs (strategic environmental assessment), the
grouping activities over space, the integration of EIA with sectorial and spatial policies, area
wide assessments and EIA systems based on natural boundaries250.
This article supports all the actions proposed by Lawrence to link EIA with related
activities in order to facilitate the detection of indirect impacts, except the “grouping activities
over space” technique, understood as the method to place together similar activities due to the
similarity of their impacts. This technique seeks to easily detect indirect impacts of an activity
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and to reduce the uncertainty of predictions by excluding the occurrence of different impacts
that may interact in unpredictable ways. The compromise to ecosystem resilience requires the
repudiation of this idea because this technique increases the intensity of a single kind of
impact, whose adverse effects will repeatedly concentrate on the same ecosystem function. It
is expected that if a certain ecosystem function is too frequently and intensely impacted by
human activities, this function is likely to collapse, which can cause the entire system to
collapse. On the other hand, if the ecosystem suffers impacts of lower intensity affecting
different functions, the ecosystem is more likely to recover from such impacts and be more
resilient. Therefore, instead of grouping similar activities in the same places, ecosystem
managers should diversify the activities’ zoning.
The link of EIA procedure with strategic environmental assessment, sectorial and
spatial policies, area wide assessments and EIA systems based on natural boundaries is an
important means of enhancing the capacity for adaptive management, and therefore, for the
enhancement of ecosystem resilience, because it provides the opportunity to cross-analyze the
information gathered by these mechanisms of data collection.
Strategic environmental assessment is the process by which environmental
considerations are required to be fully integrated into the preparation of governmental plans
and programmes potentially harmful to the environment before their final adoption251.
Because SEA is done prior to the elaboration of the overall policy, it is undertaken much
earlier in the decision-making process than environmental impact assessment, which is done
at the project level252.
Although the Espoo Convention does not explicitly require the application of SEA
procedure, it does require the Parties to undertake EIA at the project level and to apply EIA
principles to policies, plans and programs253. In 2001, the European Commission adopted a
Directive on SEA, according to which the strategic environmental assessment is to be
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undertaken ‘during the preparation of a plan or programme and before its adoption or
submission to the legislative procedure’254.
The EIA system can also link to corporate environmental management systems255
(EMS). An Environmental Management System (EMS) is a set of processes and practices that
enable an organization to reduce its environmental impacts and increase its operating
efficiency256. EMS’s benefits involve increased ability to differentiate the impacts of specific
industries and individual producers in a region and the capacity to measure environmental
performance and impacts and to target responses257.
The elaboration of EMSs usually occurs due to the free choice of industries
encouraged by the reduction of costs and the increase of efficiency and control over
environmental impacts. However, governments can stimulate industries to adopt EMS by
providing additional benefits, by leading by example with the development of EMS in
agencies and departments, or by requiring EMS in legislation. The strategy of leading by
example was adopted by Australia, where the procedure was adopted by the Australian
Agency for International Development; by Canada, where the Canadian Ministry of the
Environment is encouraging departments to adopt EMS; and by the United States, which will
require federal agencies to adopt EMS258.

Case study: spruce budworm

The case of the management of the spruce budworm in Canada was abundantly
analyzed in the specialized literature259. The analysis promoted by this article will focus on
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how the principle of resilience and, more specifically, the recommendations addressed in this
section would apply to this case.
The spruce budworm is a defoliating insect that attack trees of the boreal forests in
North America. The insect is constantly present in the forest in reduced numbers, except
during periodic outbreaks as a consequence of these outbreaks, a large portion of the mature
forest can die, causing an impact on the forest industry, which is the major economic activity
of great part of the area covered by the forest260. The tree species preferred by the budworm is
the same species preferred by the pulp industry: the balsam fir261. Therefore, the budworm
case represents a situation of direct competition between the insect and human activity.
The budworm outbreak is a natural event that contributes to forest renewal and
maintenance of species diversity. It has been occurring in the region over the last centuries
without great disturbance to humans until 1930, when the pulp industry found it had to
compete with the budworm for fiber262.
An historical overview of the management of forests in Canada shows that since
colonization there was a trend to harvest a specific species of tree at each time, thereby
changing the composition of the forest: from the late 1700s to mid-1800s there was high
grading extraction of eastern white pine for ship masts; from the mid-1800s to early 1900s
there was high grading extraction of large red spruce; and from colonial times to nowadays,
the forest came to present low abundance of eastern hemlock, which was originally very
abundant. This factor is relevant because each species presents a different vulnerability to the
spruce budworm. The eastern hemlock, for example, only experiences spruce budworm
damage in very rare cases. On the other hand, the balsam fir and the Dougles fir are the
favorite targets of the insect263. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the original setting of
the forest was more resistant to the insect, because the higher concentration of less vulnerable
trees probably created a barrier to the physical dispersion of the insect.
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Since the 1920’s several authors have recommended the utilization of silvicultural
practices to fight the recently frequent budworm outbreaks264. However, until 1995
knowledge of the effectiveness of silvicultural control was still deemed “fragmented” and the
method was never tried as a means to address the spruce budworm outbreaks265. On the other
hand, the tactic of spraying insecticides, employed since 1951266, was not abandoned even
when fenitrothion, the substance used until 1998, was proved to cause human health
problems267 and a great mortality of songbirds268 and bees269.
Thus, it is possible to conclude that, first, when the spraying was first adopted, the
knowledge about the technique was not yet complete and the collateral effects of the
substance employed by the management plan were not predicted. Therefore, if the managers
had no complete understanding neither of silvicultural measures nor of spraying, why did they
adopt the latter, which carried a greater risk of environmental impacts in case of failure?
Governmental protection of the pulp industry may explain such fact.
In fighting the budworm, the forest management plan and the pulp industry were
seeking a “definitive” solution which could provide certainty for the economic activity.
Besides that, the solution should provide the pulp industry the possibility to expand its
forestry activities, which could not be provided by silvicultural techniques. That is why
managers opted for the most aggressive option, spraying, neglecting silvicultural
management, which was deemed an uncertain solution.
The use of spraying became such a tradition in forest management for fighting the
budworm that the possibility of not using insecticides became non-existent. This situation can
be seen in the “Environmental impact assessment of experimental spruce budworm adulticide
trials”. When discussing the effects of phosphamidon, the insecticide employed by the
Program, on forest avifauna, the EIA simply compared the results of this insecticide with
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those produced by other kind of chemicals, the larvicides. The EIA analysis is exhausted by
showing that phosphamidon is the chemical less harmful to birds270. However, the EIA does
not discuss the alternative of not using chemicals at all.
The adopted management plan, which was supposed to provide certainty, inevitably
created unpredictable impacts, such as: the spread of outbreaks to areas previously not
affected by the budworm because spraying expelled the survivor insects to the neighborhoods;
dependence of the forest on the insecticide; and the risk of even greater outbreaks due to the
increasing resilience of the budworm. It is possible to infer that this policy created a perverse
final result which increased the resilience of the parasite and diminished the resilience of the
forest.
The analysis of the budworm case through the perspective of the principle of resilience
shows a sequence of management mistakes. First, the environmentally less aggressive option
to address a management issue cannot be excluded from the environmental impact
assessment. EIA provides decision makers with information about the alternatives to a
management issue. If the less aggressive option is not assessed, decision makers hardly will
be able to adequately weigh that option against the others available.
Second, decision makers must be guided by the principle of resilience to prioritize the
environmentally less aggressive option of management. The priority can be set by imposing
on the decision makers the obligation to publicly justify why a more aggressive management
option is preferred to the less aggressive one. However, it is possible to notice that if this way
of establishing the priority had been adopted in the case of the budworm, decision makers
would simply state that the silvicultural technique was not yet sufficiently developed to be
adopted. In this case, the imposition of another obligation on the decision makers would be
recommended: if a less aggressive management option is not adopted as the main measure to
address the problem, the technique should be employed in a limited area in order to test if the
reason why this solution was neglected is observed in reality. The employment of monitoring
would be essential to implement this recommendation.
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Third, the ambition for greater profits from an economic activity that is already under
way cannot be pursued to the detriment of the ecosystem where the economic activity is
located. Every government and economic actor must internalize the idea that the capacity for
growth of a certain activity is limited by the ecosystem’s capacity to support this activity. In
the budworm case, the pulp industry pushed the forest beyond its capacity to support the
forestry activity. That is why the industry rejected the silvicultural techniques, which would
have increased the concentration of tree species that are important for the health of the forest,
but that are not interesting for the pulp industry. The industry wanted to keep the high
concentrations of balsam fir and Douglas fir, which was the closest they could get to a
monoculture for pulp extraction.
Forth, under the principle of resilience, managers are required to analyze the long-term
effects of their decisions, in order to protect the interests of future generations and of nature
itself, which can be understood as the preservation of the ecosystem capacity to reorganize
and maintain itself. This precept was not followed in the case of the budworm:
The budworm analysis explicitly focuses on a time horizon determined by the slowest variable in the
system, i.e., tree regeneration and growth. It does not consider long-term evolutionary changes that can
trigger competitive shifts in tree species composition. Similarly, short-term benefits of a management
policy might be followed later by unanticipated surprises that, being unanticipated, become crises271.

In order to enable decision makers to predict and to weigh the long-term effects of a
decision, this article recommends the use of monitoring techniques because long-term effects
are hardly assessed by prior environmental impact assessment. Therefore, the commitment to
the preservation of nature and to future generations’ interests requires constant assessment of
the results obtained by management policies associated with adaptive management
techniques.

Land use and climate change adaptation
Land use and zoning regulations are usually created by local or regional governments.
The zoning plan analyzes the existing land uses and determines community development
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directions by establishing: different zone district categories, each one with different
specifications regarding the range of permitted uses, densities of constructions, and structural
characteristics; an official zone map which maps out the districts on the ground; and a zone
enforcement agency which interprets and applies the zone requirements272. Through land use
and zoning regulations, local governments prohibit certain uses within certain areas273,
thereby imposing limits on the use of property.
Land can be destined for economic uses (such as commercial, industrial, agricultural
and pastures), residential, recreational, conservational. Land use exercises a great influence on
how resources are managed because it determines or influences: the location of facilities,
residences and natural lands; the size of tracts of developed land; the amount of land
conversion; the distances between facilities and the dependence on means of transport. In
other words, land use regulation can influence production and consumption patterns. That is
why land use is intimately related to sustainable development.
By heavily influencing production and consumption patterns, land use regulations
greatly influence ecological resilience. Additionally, land use can contribute to the
conservation of biodiversity everywhere, in its original habitat. Also, as mentioned previously
(Adaptive Management section) ill land use planning can exacerbate the risk of disaster by
concentrating population in risk-prone areas and by failing to keep green infrastructure274.
The principle of resilience requires that land use regulations must prioritize ecological
resilience and safety, even if it limits economic growth in certain circumstances. This
application of the principle might appear to undermine the economy; rather, it is only going
against the short-term pursuit of profits. In reality, this measure provides a deeper
understanding of economy, as it is necessary for keeping the existence of natural resources in
the long-term, and for protecting society from disasters to which humankind has given cause
through centuries of mismanagement of natural resources. By these means, it is expected that
the principle of resilience will, in fact, benefit the economy in the long-term, by preserving
the resources and the people it depends on.
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There are some policy measures, to be explained below, that can use land use as a tool
for implementing the principle of resilience by strengthening ecological resilience and disaster
preparedness.

Transferable development rights in coastal areas

Recently, zoning regulations concerned with environmental protection in the United
States have been adopting the concept of transferable development rights (TDRs). TDRs
consist in unused development density at one site being transferred and sold to other sites that
wish to build beyond standard regulatory limits275.
TDR programs aim to direct development away from environmentally sensitive land to land more
suitable for development by creating a market for development rights. Logistically, TDR programs
achieve this result by quantifying the development potential of sensitive properties ("sending sites"),
and providing that this development potential may be sold to landowners to increase building density in
areas suitable for development ("receiving sites")276.

The transferable development rights create the advantage of avoiding the frequent
windfalls and wipeouts from land use regulation that both bar development in some places
and allow it in others. “TDRs promote sharing of the benefits generated and burdens imposed
by development restrictions. The restrictions make the TDRs more valuable both by reducing
harmful spillover effects and by requiring those with property eligible for development to
purchase development rights from other landowners”277.
In other words, transferable development rights seek to attenuate the harmful effects of
land use regulation. Nonetheless, the concept has been continuously criticized. Some argue
that, even though the TDRs provide economic value to the land targeted by the regulation,
such value does not compensate the landowner for loss of personal use of the property and
ends up by disappointing significant investment-backed expectations278.
In American law, regulatory restrictions on the use of land maintain that it may be
considered an unlawful taking if the land’s economic value is totally wiped out by the
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regulation. Even the distribution of TDRs has not prevented the filing of suits claiming
takings. Litigants seeking to impair such land use regulations go to courts on the grounds that
“although the positive economic value of TDRs mitigates the ‘economic impact’ of a
restriction on land use, such value is relevant only to the question of whether a landowner has
received ‘just compensation’ for ‘taken’ property”279. In summary, according to such critics,
the distribution of TDRs does not mean that there has been no taking in the first place.
On the other hand, zone enforcement agencies argue that transferable development
rights, instead of eliminating land property rights, are indeed reinforcing them. The zoning
rules enhance the property rights of all landowners in the area covered by the zoning plan
because those rules seek to preserve the characteristics that make the region attractive for
development. In Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency280 a zoning plan was set in place
to harmonize the protection of the Lake Tahoe basin and the development of the region. When
defending the building restriction on a piece of land especially important to the maintenance
of ecosystem functions, the local agency argued that the restricted property would be worth
even less if the restriction and the TDR mechanism were not in place, because the
environmental quality and the scenic beauty of the region as a whole would be degraded.
Transferable development rights have been maintained by the American courts, which
have been considering that, if the land still has any economic value, it follows that it has not
suffered a regulatory taking281.
Transferable development rights constitute a good mechanism to organize sustainable
development by steering development into parcels that are most environmentally suitable and
economically profitable and by sharing the economic benefits and burdens of environmental
restrictions more equitably among all landowners within a certain region.
This mechanism might also be applied to another situation that tends to be
increasingly common: the loss of land to the sea. A few cases of coastal line change by
hurricanes and loss of land property to the sea have been brought to American courts and the
rule applied is that the owner alone bears the loss of land to the sea. In Severance v.
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Patterson282, a hurricane had changed the beach shoreline, submerging the public easement
area protected by the Open Beaches Act, the state regulation that prohibits private property of
tidal lands so as to assure public access to Texan beaches. The Court decided that landowners
of coastal properties must assume the risk of losing their land to the sea and must be
conscious of the obligation to maintain the public easement covering the area between the
property and the wet beach. In that particular case, the landowner had her property reduced in
order to allow public access. The conclusion is that the public trust doctrine is more adaptable
to the changing location of the coast than to property rights because the first is dynamic, being
determined by the flexible water boundaries, and the second is static, being determined by
stable public records.
It is clear that coastal properties need to receive a more flexible legal treatment;
otherwise it is possible that land owners of entire cities could be totally deprived of their land
property rights for short periods of time. This kind of consequence would generate very
disadvantageous results: first, it would threaten legal security, because the assurance of safe
property rights is one of the most important functions of modern legal regimes; second, it
would also threaten environmental quality, because it is commonly agreed that environmental
protection requires strong property rights. The sudden loss of properties in coastal areas may
result in disorganized occupation of country side areas with no respect for environmentally
protected areas or for zoning restrictions.
That is why governments should seek to relax property rights in coastal areas through
the application of the transferable development rights regime to coastal properties. Therefore,
if the sea covers part of the property, the landowner would be entitled to the right to develop
another place. In this case, there would be no claim of takings because it would give to
landowners a right they did not previously have. This solution might increase the offer of
development rights, which, in turn, would reduce the value of such rights. However, this
effect can be corrected by strengthening the zoning regulations in all places (and not only in
coastal cities) so the new restrictions would function as the creation of a market for
development rights.
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Rise of the sea and reallocation of coastal ecosystems

In the context of climate change, land use and zoning may be used to ensure that
coastal ecosystems will have enough space to restore themselves in the new coastal lines that
are going to be defined by the rise in sea level.
The rise of the sea will require coastal ecosystems to readapt to the new ecosystem
features and to change their location to other places with similar ecological conditions. In
order to strengthen the resilience of such ecosystems, it would be necessary to carry out indepth studies regarding the current and previous features of coastal ecosystems in order to
maintain records of how they are organized now. These records will be essential to guide
human efforts to contribute towards the reconstruction of such ecosystems in other places and
to verify that the future coastal ecosystems keep the same functions currently developed by
the present coastal ecosystems. Studies should also take into account the ecological features
and natural history evidence in order to identify where the new coastal lines are expected to
be and where the new coastal ecosystems are more likely to form. Based on that information,
governments should restrict the use of land where ecosystems are expected to form, because,
if such places are completely watertight or otherwise unavailable to receive fauna and flora,
their coastal ecosystems will be fated to extinction. Those restrictions in use may be achieved
by the distribution of TDRs when possible, or through expropriation, when the restrictions
would totally abolish the economic value of the property.

Conservation easements

Conservation easement is “a legally binding agreement that restricts the development and
future use of the land to ensure protection of its conservation values”283. Through conservation
easement, the landowner voluntarily removes from his property right certain elements, generally rights
to develop and mine284. The conservation easement can be sold or donated to the government or to a
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non-profit organization, which thereby will acquire a non-possessory interest in the protection of
natural or historic values of the property285. The easement can be created to last a limited or unlimited
period of time, during which affirmative obligations attached to the real property are enforced over the
grantor and his successors by the holder of the easement286. If the holder fails to enforce the easement
related obligations, they can be enforced by a third party indicated in the easement instrument or by
the attorney general287.

The holder of the easement is responsible for undertaking long-term

monitoring of the easement and stewardship of the property288.
In the early 1980s, the Congress of the United States enacted tax subsidies for conservation
easement donations, which resulted in an increase in the number of such agreements289. However, this
measure also contributed to the concentration of conservation easements in more affluent regions,
where wealthy donors could take maximum advantage of tax incentives. Conservation easements are
currently viewed as a tool for environmental protection, concurring with regulation and public land
acquisition. Conservation easements present a lower cost than public land acquisition in the shortterm; however, they might be considered more expensive in the long-term due to expenses with
monitoring, enforcement, and defense290.
Due to climate change, conservation easements might acquire new uses, as an alternative to
TDRs for preserving areas that are expected to be the new coastal lines during the rise in sea level.
This tool would be efficient both to maintain private properties in areas that will not be lost to the sea
and to protect coastal ecosystems’ resilience by keeping undeveloped areas that are expected to
acquire an essential ecological role in preventing the extinction of coastal ecosystems during the next
decades.

“Reserva florestal legal”

In 1965, the Brazilian federal government enacted the country’s Forest Code, which
obliges every rural property to reserve a parcel of the land, which may range from 20 to 80
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percent of the property, for the protection of the original flora291. The land protected under
this rule is called reserva florestal legal.
Reserva legal was created to promote the sustainable use of natural resources; the
conservation and regeneration of ecological processes; and the conservation of biodiversity,
by preserving the native flora that shelters native fauna292.
The localization of reserva legal within the rural property is determined by the
landowner and must be approved by the environmental agency at the landowner’s request.
Once the localization is established and the reserva legal is registered, it imposes perpetual
conservation obligations on the landowner and his successors.
Reserva legal is an administrative limitation imposed on the use of private property293.
This obligation intends to shape the rural private property in order to ensure that it
accomplishes its social function294. According to the Brazilian Constitution, every private
property must fulfill its social function295, which requirements are established by the
Constitution. As for rural property, the constitutional requirements are the following: rational
and adequate enjoyment of the land; adequate employment of available natural resources and
environmental protection; compliance with labor laws; exploitation in such a way as to ensure
the welfare of owners and employers296.
If the landowner fails to use the land in such a way as to accomplish its social
function, the government can expropriate the property, by compensating the owner. This
penalty, however, has not been applied to rural properties in non-compliance with
environmental laws. In fact, for several decades, since the establishment of the obligation to
create reserva legal, there was no concrete penalty for a landowner’s failure to register this
protected land. This situation was changed in 2008, when the federal government established
daily monetary fines for every rural property that fails to register its reserva legal297.
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The regulation caused strong public debates between farmers and environmentalists
because the farmers believe that the government is attributing to them an excessive share of
the burdens of environmental protection. In part due to these debates, proposals for reform of
the Brazilian Forest Code are currently being analyzed by the Brazilian Congress. Rural
landowners are pressing the government to reduce the percentages of land the law requires to
be registered as reserva legal and to expand the range of land uses at the reserva legal
allowed by the law. Environmentalists have been calling on the government representatives to
apply the non-regression principle in order to prevent the reduction of environmental
protection around the country.
Currently, Brazilian law holds the landowner responsible for maintaining the forest in
reserva legal by planting native trees when necessary according to the legal requirements and
the guidance provided by the federal environmental agency298. The landowner is allowed to
promote sustainable use of the forest preserved as reserva legal, as long as his Plan of Use is
approved by the environmental agency299. The landowner can exploit resources taken from
the trees and even cut down selected trees, by promoting silvicultural studies and reforestation
efforts in order to keep the main characteristics of the flora300. Besides the right to sustainably
use the forest resources, the landowner is also entitled to total exemption from federal tax
related to the reserva legal area301.
Reserva legal has some similarities with conservation easements, because both
policies promote environmental conservation on private properties; provide tax benefits to the
landowners; and impose obligations that are attached to the real property and enforceable on
the current land owner and his successors.
Unlike the conservation easement, the establishment of reserva legal is mandatory,
which prevents the downside of having environmental conservation concentrated in wealthier
areas. For this reason, this might be a better solution for environmental policies in developing
countries. On the other hand, reserva legal is less adaptable than conservation easements to
the circumstances of the case because there is no voluntary agreement by which the owner can
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choose the rights of property he is weaving through the conservation easement. Also, in
mandatory for all rural properties, reserva legal is more able to ensure the conservation of
biodiversity everywhere.

Restrictions on farming methods

Currently agriculture alone is responsible for 85% of water consumption, covers 35 to
40% of world land and accounts for 30% of global greenhouse gases emission302. These
resources are mostly used to grow food for the world’s population, which is an essential
economic activity that cannot be impaired. However, in many cases, crops are cultivated in
non-sustainable ways, greatly contributing to the rapid depletion of water and soil around the
world303. Therefore, it is expected that better management of the use of natural resources by
agriculture can generate a meaningful reduction of the consumption of resources and of
environmental impacts at the same rate as improvements in the provision of ecological
services.
New methods of sustainable agriculture have been developed in order to enhance soil
nutrient cycling and reduce the need for fertilizers and pesticides.
Recent studies have pointed to permaculture as a very successful sustainable method
of cultivating the soil. This method tries to recreate the functional diversity of ecosystems by
using stored rainwater to support the growth of multiple functional groups of species – such as
atmospheric nitrogen absorption, soil fixation, and shadow – in order to create an indefinitely
self-sustained agriculture304. That is why the method’s name derives from “permanent
agriculture”. This method reduces aridity; soil impoverishment by erosion; salinity and

302

Jonathan Foley, A Global Crisis of Land Use and Agriculture, STOCKHOLM RESILIENCE CENTER (June 1st,
2010), http://www.stockholmresilience.org/5.58f663a12dd939780a80001819.html.
303
The Aral Sea shrank 300 kilometers since the 1960s, when the soviets started diverting water from its two
tributaries for crop irrigation. The Colorado River, in the United States, does not reach the Ocean anymore
because of excessive water diversion for agriculture in the desert. Id. Soil problems, such as salinity, erosion,
acidification and tree decline are symptoms of ecosystem breakdown. Oliver Holmgren, Weeds or Wild Nature,
PERMACULTURE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL (1997),
http://www.holmgren.com.au/frameset.html?http://www.holmgren.com.au/html/Writings/weeds.html
304
P. A. YEOMANS, WATER FOR EVERY FARM, (1973).
©2011 Lia Helena Demange

92

acidification305. Indeed, mixing crops has been achieving very successful results in pushing
back the desert and increasing per capita food production in African countries along the
Sahara’s edge, such as Nigeria, Niger, Senegal, Burkina Faso and Kenya306. Similarly good
results were observed in Jordan307. In Honduras, sustainable agriculture developed through the
employment of traditional knowledge reduced the impacts of hurricanes in the Quezungal
region308.
Permaculture and other sustainable agriculture initiatives could be encouraged through
governmental regulation of land use or incentives such as tax deductions in order to reduce
environmental impacts and improve the provision of ecosystems services within agriculture.
Adaptive management initiatives could implement these sustainable agriculture techniques in
pilot-projects to test which of them are more adequate for certain regions. The success of
these initiatives can also work as a showcase to encourage nearby farmers to adopt them.
Local land use or other natural resource management regulations can prohibit crops
that are totally inadequate to local ecosystems, such as lettuce and alfalfa - high water
demanding crops – in deserts309. For example, in the United States, states that apply the prior
appropriation doctrine for water uses310 could push for more sustainable uses of water in
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agriculture by enacting regulatory provisions that classify as non-beneficial the use of water to
irrigate crops that are inappropriate to the local climate311.

“Global zoning”

The idea of “global zoning” for agriculture was based on a proposal suggested by
Jonathan Foley312. When discussing solutions to feed a growing population with limited and
already over-exploited natural resources, Foley suggested focusing on existing fields to select
places where the production of each crop is more prolific and to verify in which other place
around the globe the same kind of climate and soil is found. By comparing such physically
similar places, it is possible to verify where land management is deterring food production.
With such data in hand, an international organization such as FAO could create “global
zoning” to assess which crop has greater potential in each region. By these means, it would be
possible to assess which parties from which parts of the world would benefit most from
partnerships among government’s agencies and/or economic actors for interchange of
management experiences. As noticed by Foley, this method presents the risk of encouraging
the expansion of monocultures, which is a result that totally goes against the idea of
sustainable agriculture. In order to prevent such a risk, the international organization should
focus its assessment on the most effective combination of certain climate and soil and a
certain mix of crops (instead of individual crops).

Market mechanisms for conserving ecosystem services
The payment for ecosystem services is a manner of both valuing and preserving the
benefits ecosystems generate to humans. It is a tradeoff where the user of the ecosystem
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service pays the value of the service to the owner of the natural capital that provides the
service. The payment for ecosystem services stimulates the owner of the natural capital to
preserve the natural mechanism thereby generating an economic activity guided towards
preservation and designed to compete with the economic activities that would result in the
destruction of the natural capital.
Payment for ecosystem services is mainly based on the traditional market theory and
on Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons313. The market theory relies on the following
assumptions: economic actors are rational and selfish and the demand for resources is
determined by the price, not by the finitude of resources. A market for ecosystem services
must provide benefits that exceed the costs of trade, that is, informational and transaction
costs. Besides that, as investments tend to go where they can generate more income, payment
for ecosystem services should be greater than the profits that would be received by the owner
of the natural capital if he were to develop the land.
From an economic perspective, ecosystem services present the following
characteristics: they are positive externalities, in the sense that their effects cross the
boundaries of the land where the natural capital is located to benefit the economic actors
located in the proximate area; it is difficult to exclude a user’s access to the services and, by
this reason, such services are very susceptible to free riders (term used to designate the person
who enjoys an economic benefit without having to pay for it); ecosystem services are not
usually traded in the market and, for that reason, their price has to be determined by
mechanisms that mimic the market (such as the mechanisms employed in cost-benefit
analysis to measure the benefits of protecting the environment).
Garrett Hardin has put light on the application of the market theory to environmental
protection in the Tragedy of the Commons314. Hardin’s model describes the common
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evolution of events when private benefits are obtained from finite and common resources.
Unlike the market theory, Hardin’s model assumes the finitude of resources. As the market
theory, however, Hardin believes that economic actors act in a selfish manner. Hardin’s
conclusion is that environmental protection is obtained only by two means: private property or
regulation to internalize externalities. Hardin’s theory is only adequate for explaining the
results of exploitation of common resources where access cannot be excluded. The main
criticism of this theory is that it does not account for social norms as an alternative means for
addressing environmental protection315.
Following Hardin’s lead, payment for ecosystem services does not consider the
importance of social norms in addressing environmental protection. On the other hand, the
principle of resilience recognizes the importance of social norms, especially moral norms, in
protecting the environment. It is due to this distinction that the principle of resilience will
establish limits to the application of the payment of ecosystem services as a tool for
implementing environmental protection.
The first limitation the principle of resilience creates to the payment for ecosystem
services refers to private initiatives for creating a market for ecosystem services, which shall
be called private payment for ecosystem services from now on in this article. Ruhl et al
exemplify the creation of such a market through private initiative when there are a large
number of economic actors both on the service users and on the natural capital owners’ sides.
In this situation, the common pathway would be: a sufficient number of natural capital owners
need to identify each other, agree to threaten to eliminate the natural capital, evaluate the
ecosystem service benefits, identify the service users, develop a strategy for negotiating with
them, and devise a method for allocating any payments received among the group316.

way, the weight of each animal will be greatly reduced and each owner will end up having less benefit than he or
she had in the first place. Therefore, the decision made by one person with an individualistic point of view will
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Such a pathway towards the payment of ecosystem services raises concern under the
principle of resilience because it departs from the idea that whoever owns the natural capital
needs to threaten the ecosystem before receiving payment for maintaining it. If high-lighting
the threat to the ecosystem element is not sufficient to show the obviously unethical character
of such a pathway, it might be useful to compare this strategy to one used by a criminal who
takes someone as a hostage and promises to kill the hostage if he does not receive the money
he required. The structure of thinking is the same in both situations. One may argue that the
first situation is not as grave as the second because it refers to plants, animals, and the biotic
community as a whole, while the second refers to people. Of course this is a valid argument
and this article does not seek to affirm that people are less or as important as other members
of the land mechanism - human life is always above other ethical values. Rather, this
comparison is based on the assumption that both human lives and nature have an inherent
value and a good of their own317, which means that both are entities deserving of moral
concern and consideration and, therefore, “all moral agents have a prima facie duty to
promote or preserve the entity’s good as an end in itself”318.
The moral obligation to respect every forms of life was already recognized by the
United Nations General Assembly, that affirmed: “every form of life is unique, warranting
respect regardless of its worth to man, and, to accord other organisms such recognition, man
must be guided by a moral code of action”319.
The theory of private payment for ecosystem services contains several aspects that
evince lack of respect for nature. Besides threatening nature as a requirement for creating
markets by private initiative, by attributing a monetary value to the benefits nature brings to
humankind, the model for commercialization of ecosystem services unavoidably treats nature
as a product. Studies such as the Stern Report, which calculates the total value of Earth’s
ecosystem services, might be useful for evincing the importance of nature for economic
actors. However, this kind of assessment contributes to eroding in people’s minds the idea
that some things have values that cannot be totally translated into monetary amounts. In other
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words, treating nature as a product is antithetical to the aim of attributing an inherent value to
nature and respecting nature.
Also, private payment for ecosystem services attributes no value to ecosystem services
that do not benefit humans because they are located far away from human populations320.
Therefore, the theory shows no consideration for ecological functions that are provided for the
sole benefit of wild beings. According to Paul Taylor, this attitude demonstrates no respect for
nature, even if it has the potential to benefit nature in many situations:
People who have an exclusively human-centered view-point in environmental matters may at times
perform actions that in fact further the good of wild creatures. But their actions do not express the
attitude of respect for nature because they are not done for the sake of the wild creatures themselves.
The underlying aim is to benefit humans, either immediately or in the long run321.

Due to the lack of respect for nature noted as the basis of the theory of private
payment for ecosystem services, this form of payment should be refrained from all together,
because the attitude of respect for nature entails being disposed to refrain from certain kinds
of action because of their inherent qualities or future consequences322. Following Leopold’s
thinking, aiming for a state of harmony with nature means seeking harmony with the whole
land mechanism323; one cannot claim to respect nature if one accepts the adoption of legal or
economical mechanisms that disregard the moral obligations humans must have towards the
land mechanism.
Private payment for ecosystem services generates not only moral issues, but also
ecological issues. By being human-centered, payment for ecosystem services results solely in
the preservation of ecological functions that are important to humans (not in the protection of
ecological functions that are important only to the land mechanism)324. Also, payment for
ecosystem services tends to rely on the minimum parcel of the land mechanism necessary for
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maintaining the service, therefore focusing on the keystone species that represent the different
functional groups and guarantee the basic functioning of the ecosystem325. However, the
maintenance of keystone species cannot ensure the continuity of the ecosystem. In order to
strengthen the resilience of the ecosystem, it is necessary not only to preserve the keystone
species, but also the redundant species, because those will be the “insurance capital” which
guarantees the continuity of that specific function in case one of the keystone species is
extinct from the ecosystem326. Therefore, payment for maintaining the keystone species can
erode ecological redundancy and weaken ecosystem resilience.
Is it possible to create a market for ecosystem services through private initiative that
does not incur the ethical wrong of threatening nature? The only situation this work envisions
that would be exempt from this wrong doing would be the case where the user offers to pay
for the ecosystem services before the owner of the natural capital considers destroying the
ecosystem to develop the land. This might seem an unusual situation because, due to the
difficulty in excluding access to natural services, the user probably will be already enjoying
the service for free before any transaction is made with the owner of the natural capital327.
Thus, the user hardly would spontaneously offer to pay for something that he takes for
granted.
However, although a voluntarily offer to pay for ecosystem services might not be the
rule, it may occur under certain circumstances. It is the case when the natural capital exists
but does not generate the ecosystem service due to mismanagement by the owner. In this case,
the potential user might assess the reason why he is not receiving the service and offer to pay
for the owner of the natural capital to correct the management problem in order to make the
provision of ecosystem services possible. This situation occurred in the municipality of
Extrema, in the Brazilian state of Minas Gerais.
In Extrema, the municipality noticed that the water bodies that supplied water for the
city presented a decrease in water quality because farmers upstream allowed their cattle to
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walk in the water bodies, thereby increasing erosion328. In order to improve water quality and
reduce costs of water treatment in the supply system, the municipality paid the farmers to
fence off the water bodies that passed through their properties in order to prevent erosion,
both by blocking the access of cattle and by reforesting the margins of headwaters.
In another situation, the user of an ecosystem service that is currently being provided
might also decide to voluntarily offer payment for the service when he notices that the service
is fundamental to the continuity of his economic activity and that he will be better off paying
the service and ensuring its continuity rather than taking the risk of losing the service in case
the owner of the natural capital decides to develop the land.
Except those situations where the user of the service voluntarily offers to pay for the
ecosystem service, this article envisions no other means through which the creation of a
market for ecosystem services by private initiative would not compel the user to enter into a
contract due to an immoral threat by the owner of natural capital.
Although payment for ecosystem services raises several reasons for concern, this tool
has a major benefit that justifies its consideration it as a valid and useful means of promoting
environmental protection: when implemented, payment for ecosystem services inverts the
legal and economic trend noticed throughout history to incentivize the development of the
land and the destruction of ecosystem services329. That is why it is often presented as a useful
tool for conservation.
Seeking to promote the benefit generated by the payment for ecosystem services
without incurring the wrongdoing of threatening nature, this article accepts the employment of
such a preservation tool in the following cases: when service users voluntarily propose to pay
for the ecosystem service; or when the trading program is used as a tool to encourage
compliance with regulations that oblige the preservation of the ecosystem in certain parcels of
land.
The first model, which can be called the voluntary payment for ecosystem services,
does not solve the problem of preserving solely ecosystem functions that are useful to humans
or of adopting a human-centered perspective that undermines the attitude of respect for
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nature: these issues can be addressed by applying the voluntary payment for ecosystem
services in conjunction with the second model - that can be called regulatory payment for
ecosystem services. The ecosystem-broad regulation of the regulatory payment for ecosystem
services regulates the preservation of ecological integrity in a determined portion of land,
therefore adopting a bio-centered perspective that ensures the preservation of every ecological
function, both those that help the ecosystem to maintain itself, and those that are useful to
humans.
Therefore, voluntary payment for ecosystem services can be adopted only when there
is already in place an ecosystem-broad regulation which, with or without a system of
regulatory payment for ecosystem services, provides protection to whole ecosystems in a
minimal area able to guarantee the maintenance of their resilience. In this context, voluntary
payment for ecosystem services covers additional protection of nature, never being used as a
single tool to promote environmental protection. The stem of environmental protection and
preservation of ecosystem resilience must rely on a regulation that requires the preservation of
all ecosystem functions within a minimum extension of preserved land.
Another important feature of relying on regulation as the stem of environmental
protection is that every landowner is presumably obliged to conserve nature while in private
or voluntary payment for ecosystem services the landowner is presumed to have no such
obligation. That is why in markets initiated by regulation, the landowner who does not
preserve is obliged to pay somebody else for it in her name, while in private and voluntary
markets the landowner who develops the land does not have any obligation while the one who
preserves receives a payment for it. The first mindset is much more coherent with the
principle of resilience’s moral premise that everybody should respect and preserve the land
mechanism.
The municipality of Extrema, in Brazil, is an example of both voluntary payment for
ecosystem services and regulatory payment for ecosystem services. That is so because the
municipality voluntarily offered to pay for the preservation of vegetation around the
headwaters, which is already required by Brazilian law330. Therefore, Extrema is an example
of regulatory payment for ecosystem services for stimulating conservation on-site. There is
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also regulatory payment for ecosystem services for stimulating conservation off-site when
conservation on-site is not recommended, for which it is possible to mention as examples
wetland banking in the United States and servidão florestal (in English, environmental
servitude) in Brazil.
In the United States, filling wetlands requires a prior permit from the Corps of
Engineers331. The Corps guidelines for giving the so-called 404 permits attend to the
following order of desirability: the developer should avoid filling wetlands; he should
minimize the adverse impacts to wetlands that cannot be avoided; and he should provide
compensatory mitigation for unavoidable impacts. In order to be allowed to fill the wetland,
the developer must prove that no reasonable alternatives exist to the development of the
wetlands332. Compensation for the impacts can be implemented on-site or off-site, but off-site
mitigation banking is preferred over on-site because of the greater efficiency, scale effects,
and environmental protection333
The Brazilian restriction on rural private property known as reserva legal (see the
Land use topic) presents some market mechanisms to relax the legal obligation to preserve
native forest in every track of rural land. If the property has no native forest, the Brazilian
Forest Code allows the landowner to buy a new tract of land to establish the reserva legal, or
to establish it on a third party land, through servidão florestal or Cotas de Reserva
Florestal334. The compensation is allowed only if the land is located in the same microwatershed, has the same size and same physical characteristics as his land335.
Both wetlands mitigation and servidão florestal are market instruments employed for
promoting the restoration of the whole ecosystem in the most economically feasible place. In
both countries, priority is given to the preservation of the ecosystem where it is located
because the market instrument is applied only when keeping the ecosystem on-site would
impair the economic activity (i.e. the development of wetlands is allowed if the developer
proves to have no reasonable alternative, which means that the destruction of the wetland is
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avoided solely to the extent that it does not impair the economic activity) or would be
environmentally disadvantageous and more expensive (i.e. the establishment of servidão
florestal is only allowed when the developed land has no remaining native vegetation,
evincing the priority given to the preservation of an existing forest rather than planting a new
forest where it was previously destroyed). Once it is not possible to keep the ecosystem in its
original place, wetlands mitigation gives priority to off-site mitigation due to greater
efficiency in evaluating compliance, while reserva legal gives priority to near-site
compensation, in order to ensure the existence of protected land in every micro-watershed and
to prevent the creation of “hot spots” of developed land.
The obligation to preserve the whole ecosystem takes away concerns such as the
monetization of nature and the utilitarian selection of protected ecosystem services and
species, which can be found in private payment for ecosystem services. Regulatory payment
for ecosystem services abolishes the monetization of nature because it promotes a change in
perspective: while in the private payment for ecosystem services the determination of the price
of ecosystem services is focused on the monetization of the benefits ecosystems generate to
humans336; the determination of the price paid in regulatory payment for ecosystem services
on-site is focused on how much the regeneration of the ecosystem will cost to whoever
assumes the responsibility for it, because whoever pays for the maintenance of the ecosystem
(probably the government) is not directly the user of the service. The existence of the
regulation prior to the development of a market for ecosystem services demonstrates that the
society in question already values conservation; otherwise, it would not create the regulation
for conserving the ecosystem.
In this setting, accounting for ecosystem benefits is not as useful, because citizens do
not need to be reminded of the importance of conservation by giving monetary values to
ecosystem services. In such a legal environment, payment to whoever preserves the natural
resources is not a source of profit: rather, it would be better characterized as a compensation
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for the costs that person undertook in preserving resources that will contribute to the greater
good.
One may argue that if regulatory payment for ecosystem services on-site brings no
profit to the owner of the natural capital, payment for ecosystem services will not achieve its
intent; that is, to provide an economic incentive substantial enough to discourage the
landowner from developing his land. However, it is necessary to remember that the owner of
natural resources is obliged by regulation to keep the natural capital.
It is clear that the downside of such a measure, and of any regulation for
environmental protection, is to discourage conservation beyond the level determined by the
law. Conservation beyond the level required by the law in each tract of land will be achieved
in settings that allow the owner of the natural capital to obtain profit: the voluntary payment
for ecosystem services; and the regulatory payment for ecosystem services for stimulating
conservation off-site337.
The commitment of the principle of resilience to long-term efficiency in the
management of natural resources requires mechanisms that ensure the perpetuity of preserved
lands. Market mechanisms associated or not with regulations must be designed in a way that
prevents the easy conversion of currently protected land into developed land when the
economic incentive ends338. There is lack of certainty regarding the permanence of wetlands
protected under the wetland banking system, which is one of the main disadvantages of this
market mechanism. In Brazil, this issue was addressed by characterizing reserva legal as an
obligation propter rem: a permanent restriction on the usufruct of the land, which must to be
respected by every future owners339. However, if the compensation of reserva legal is made
through the use of servidão florestal, there are no guarantees that such vegetation will be
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protected after the ending of the servitude, because the servitude is not required by law to be
permanent340.
The obligation to preserve the whole ecosystem prevents the utilitarian selection of
protected species and ecosystem services because whoever manages the natural resources will
be forced by the agencies’ guidelines to preserve all species, not only the ones that have
economic value.
In conclusion, the payment for ecosystem services is compatible with the principle of
resilience solely as long as it is preceded by a regulation that ensures the preservation of the
ecosystem in an area where conservation is well-known to be needed to fulfill ecological
requirements for keeping ecosystem resilience. Voluntary payment for ecosystem services can
be used to promote protection in areas where the importance of preservation is secondary, or
where the results of preservation are being tested by adaptive management decisions.

340

Law n. 6938/1981, art. 9-A, caput (Braz.).
©2011 Lia Helena Demange

105

CONCLUSION
Sustainable development is essentially a means to implement the land ethic. Failure in
doing so risks reducing the concretization of sustainable development to mere duplication of
old development, so called the kind of development that gives sole consideration to economic
growth, not to environmental preservation.
The acknowledgement of the principle of resilience fills the vacuum existing in the
operationalization of the principle of sustainable development regarding situations where
environmental protection cannot be conciliated with economic growth. The principle of
resilience prevents this vacuum from being filled by the most powerful interest in the conflict
– the economic – by providing greater legal protection to the weakest interest in the balance –
the environmental. The principle of resilience consolidates justice in a situation of natural
inequality by prioritizing the preservation of the environment in decision making. Thereby,
the principle assists the Law to fulfill its most prominent function of applying justice to
concrete cases.
The principle of resilience also obliges decision makers and operators of the law to
consider the long term effects of their acts on nature and on present and future generations. By
infusing ecological long-term concerns with patterns of occupation of land, consumption and
production, the legal principle of resilience guarantees that old unsustainable patterns are not
replicated during rebuilding after natural disasters and relocating displaced people. The
ultimate result is the prevention of disasters and the avoidance of repetition of palliative
measures.
The principle of resilience provides an ecological foundation to economy which
stresses the value of replicating components of ecological resilience in economy. The
principle enhances the enforcement of sustainable yield by acknowledging that economic
growth must be restrained when deemed necessary to prevent total exhaustion of natural
resources. Therefore, the application of the principle to economy calls attention not only to
restrictions on the exploitation of natural resources but also to the need to close the life-cycle
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of materials through “reuse and recycle”341. In a broader sense, the principle acknowledges
that humans must live in such a way as not to impair the maintenance of ecological functions
that ensure the provision of resources and services which both society and the economy
depend upon to continue existing. As the final result of this effort is the maintenance of
subsidies for a balanced society and a stable economy, it is possible to affirm that the
principle of resilience provides greater economic efficiency in the long term and a deeper
understanding of economy.
The inclusion of ecological concepts in the functioning of the economy can accelerate
the adoption of green economy and make it more resilient because the principle of resilience
provides not only an ecological foundation, but also a moral background to the green
economy, which is essential to prevent this concept from being sidetracked by traditional
economic interests during implementation.
As demonstrated, the use of the principle of resilience will have tangible and practical
benefits for society. However, this article does not espouse the principle of resilience only for
its utilitarian benefits, but also for its values and for the benefits it will generate to nature
itself. Therefore, it is a basic premise of the principle of resilience that its ethical values be
enforced even when no utilitarian benefits are expected to arise from it.
The social enforcement of individual and moral obligations generated by the principle
of resilience requires education for conservation in order to enable people to internalize the
inherent value of nature and the goal to live in harmony with the land mechanism. Education
for conservation also provides people with the necessary knowledge to identify how resilience
is being harmed and what they can do to prevent despised effects on nature.
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economy in China, (2006)). In the United States, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) adopts
the “cradle to the grave” approach, which tracks hazardous waste from generation to disposal requiring waste
generators and transporters and on owners of treatment, storage and disposal facilities to sign and keep a record
on the waste characteristics, origins and final disposal. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 USC
§6922(a)(5). See PLATER, ET AL, supra note 6, at 743-772.
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Because the principle of resilience addresses moral obligations vested with legal
enforcement, it cannot be considered a sectoral principle, applied solely to conducts practiced
by environment agencies; rather, it is a cross-cutting principle that must be applied at the
highest level of private and public institutions in order to influence decision making in every
sector342.
This article repeatedly demonstrated that the foundations of the principle of resilience
are already present in International Environmental Law and, consequently, that this is already
a general principle of International Law. Although the principle already exists buried within
other principles, we can only enjoy its benefits and apply it to legal procedures when it
becomes expressly recognized and systematized in the international level. Thus, the principle
can be incorporated in future treaties and influence the interpretation of existing international
agreements; it can also be recognized in domestic law, thereby shaping new regulations and
influencing the interpretation of domestic law by judges and administrators.
Since the adoption of Agenda 21, States have come to understand and to apply
sustainable development343. In twenty years, environmental problems became worse. The
patterns of deterioration show that conservation without resilience is not enough. That is why
this article concludes that, after the recognition of the principle of resilience in the
international legal system, the next step for ensuring implementation of the principle in the
international sphere is to infuse Agenda 21 with the principle of resilience.

342

The cross-cutting applicability of the principle of resilience is in consonance with concerns repeatedly
expressed during the discussions about desirable features of policies on sustainable consumption and production
held at the Intergovernmental Preparatory Meeting (IPM) for the nineteenth session of the United Nations
Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD 19). See, Summary of the Intergovernmental Preparatory
Meeting for the Nineteenth Session of the Commission on Sustainable Development, vol. 5 n. 293 EARTH
NEGOTIATIONS BULLETIN, 6-8, available at http://www.iisd.ca/csd/ipm19/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2011) (quoting
Toolseeram Ramjeawon, Sustainable Consumption and Production efforts in SIDS, Intergovernmental
Preparatory Meeting for the Nineteenth Session of the Commission on Sustainable Development, New York,
U.S., Feb. 28 - Mar. 4, 2011).
343
“Humanity stands at a defining moment in history. We are confronted with a perpetuation of disparities
between and within nations, a worsening of poverty, hunger, ill health and illiteracy, and the continuing
deterioration of the ecosystems on which we depend for our well-being. However, integration of environment
and development concerns and greater attention to them will lead to the fulfillment of basic needs, improved
living standards for all, better protected and managed ecosystems and a safer, more prosperous future. No nation
can achieve this on its own; but together we can - in a global partnership for sustainable development”. United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., Juen 3-14, 1992, Agenda 21, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1(Vol.I), Preamble 1.1.
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